Update – Le Ponant: Acquitted Somalis Obtain Compensation for Trial Detention

After their acquittal in June 2012, the two Somalis tried for the 2008 hijack of the luxury yacht Le Ponant have recently obtained financial compensation for their 4 year-long detention in France.

The two Somalis Acquitted of piracy on a subway in Paris - Le Monde

The two Somalis Acquitted of piracy on a subway in Paris – Le Monde

We have previously reported about Le Ponant trial here. Along with the 2 acquitted individuals, a third Somali was convicted to 4 years but released immediately after the verdict upon having served his sentence. We have also reported about their living conditions in France here (see also, similarly, here). In addition, 2 other accused were sentenced to 10 and 7 years of detention, respectively. We have made available the judgement in the case here. No appeal was launced by the prosecution or the defendants.

The compensation, among the first of its kind for individuals acquitted in piracy trials before various national courts of States engaged in anti-piracy acitivies off the coast of Somalia, includes 90.000 Euros each in moral damages and 3.000 and 5.000 euros each, respectively, for the loss of their salary as fishermen while in detention. The lawyers for the two Somalis have appealed the decision, seeking 450.000 Euros instead. Meanwhile, the Somalis continue to live in France, pending a decision on their request for asylum. 

Upcoming Event: “Counter Piracy – Rules for the Use of Force” Conference in London, UK

The international conference “Counter Piracy – Rules for the Use of Force” will take place in London, UK on 8 February 2013. The event aims to bring together various stakeholders in the anti-piracy field, including maritime lawyers, flag States, ship-owners and shipping  associations, insurance companies and P&I Clubs as well as maritime security companies and other interested parties. The main topic of discussion will be the legal framework relevant to the use of force by privately contracted security personnel in the maritime industry, particularly the status of the so called “100 Series Rules”.

The 100 Series Rules, developed by David Hammond, aim to be an international model standard and example benchmark of best practice for the use of force in the maritime and anti-piracy field for application by privately contracted armed security personnel and private maritime security companies. Further details about the 100 Series Rules can be found at www.100seriesrules.com.

The Report of the International Piracy Ransoms Task Force is Available

The International Piracy  Ransoms Task Force, established at the London Conference on Somalia, issued its final Report on December 2012. The objective of the Task Force, composed of representatives of 14 States, was “to develop a greater understanding of the payment of ransoms in cases of piracy, in order to put forward policy recommendations to the international community as to how to avoid, reduce or prevent the payment of ransoms. The ultimate goal of this effort is to reach a point where pirates are no longer able to profit from ransom payments and thus abandon the practice of kidnapping for ransom.”

The conclusions and recommendations of the Task Force, included in the Report, build upon the following main options to reduce and avoid the risk of ransom payments to pirates:

  • strengthen the co-ordination between Flag States, the private sector and military responders to prepare for potential hostage situations, in order to shorten the decision-making process during the narrow window of opportunity for intervention after a piracy incident;
  • develop a new strategic partnership between Flag States, the private sector and law enforcement agencies that brings together those tackling piracy and those subjected to it in a united effort to break the piracy business model. In particular, this partnership should develop a more co-ordinated approach to information-sharing which would greatly enhance the quality and quantity of information exchange both to reduce ransom payments and to provide evidence to pursue and prosecute all involved in piracy, from those directly attacking ships to the kingpins who direct this organised crime;
  • encourage the implementation of anti-piracy measures, including still greater compliance with industry Best Management Practice, under the leadership of flag states and supported by the private sector, including insurance companies, in whose interests it is to mitigate risks.

Among the main practical recommendations put forward in the Report are the consolidation of various regional information-sharing frameworks to achieve a “one stop shop” mechanism for the diffusion of relevant information in the immediate post-hijack phase; the conduct of ransom negotiations with the knowledge of relevant national and international authorities in order to foster mutual assistance between these and the private sector; and the development of a mechanism maximising the evidence-gathering process immediately after the release of the vessel or its crew for subsequent prosecutions.

In line with the Task Force’s objective, the 15 page-long Report focuses mainly on the establishment of broad policies to improve communication and coordination to prevent hostage and ransom situations in the future. Several of these policies have been already under discussion for long time and by a number of institutions involved in the fight against piracy. Hopefully, the issuing of the Report will provide for a swift implementation of these policies. Regrettably, the Report does not contain an analysis and more practical recommendations directly relevant to actual hostage-taking, vessels’ hijacks and, more particularly, ransom situations. Given the wealth of knowledge and the technical resources available to the Task Force and its member states, as well as other participants from the private sector, it would have been preferable to expand on the Task Force’s mandate to immediately initiate an information sharing and lesson-learned process relevant to these aspects of piracy ransoms.

Liability for the Destruction of Suspected Pirate Skiffs?

In one of their latest reported joint anti-piracy operation, EUNAVFOR and Combined Task Force 151 announced the disruption of potential piracy attacks off the Somali coast. In November 2012, the Romanian frigate ROS Regele Ferdinand, under EUNAVFOR command, and Turkish warship TCG Gemlik, of Combined Task Force 151, apprehended nine suspected pirates at sea off the coast of Somalia. Earlier, a Swedish EUNAVFOR maritime patrol aircraft located the skiff at 420 nautical miles east of Mogadishu, an area known for pirate activities. At the scene, the TGC Gemlik sent a boarding team to intercept and search the suspected vessel, which for over an hour tried to evade capture. The suspected pirates were then embarked onto the ROS Regele Ferdinand for futher questioning and evidence collection to assess the possibility of their prosecution. No fishing supplies were found on board, while it remains unclear whether the suspects were armed. Shortly after their apprehension, the suspected pirates were released onto a Somali beach for lack of sufficient evidence to proceed to their prosecution. According to EUNAVFOR, despite the strong suspicion that it was a pirate boat, it was determined that there was not sufficient evidence to build a case and prosecute the suspected pirates, as they were not caught actually committing any crime. In additon, building a case against the suspects would be too time-consuming and onerous.

German frigate Hamburg sinks an abandoned skiff off the coast of Somalia. Credit: Christian Bundeswehr - Reuters

German frigate Hamburg sinks an abandoned skiff off the coast of SomaliaCredit: Christian Bundeswehr – Reuters

However, their skiff and other effects on board, including fuel and ladders, were instead destroyed. According to EUNAVFOR, this will prevent the suspected pirates from using the skiff to attack ships in the future. By means of example, this incident, by no means uncommon, raises the question of the diffferent evidentiary grounds and standards of proof for the prosecution of suspected pirates and the destruction of boats and equipment belonging to them. While the destruction of a pirate vessel can prevent the perpetration of further piracy attacks, the sinking of a fishing boat, however small, might put a strain to the fishermen’s livelihoods. Article 106 of UNCLOS (and Article 110(3)) provides for the possible liability for any loss or damange caused by the seizure of a suspected pirate ship when effected without adequate grounds.

Liability for seizure without adequate grounds

Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

What are the grounds for the seizure and destruction of suspected pirate vessels and how do these differ from those provided for the arrest and prosecution of suspected pirates? In this regard, the legal framework applicable to the contrast to piracy, particularly in Somalia, needs some additional clarification and interpretation. UNCLOS explicitly provides only for a right of visit when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a ship is engaged in piracy (Article 110) and for a right of hot pursuit of a ship into the high seas only when there are good reasons to believe that a violation was committed (Article 111). The SUA Convention, its additional protocol, as well as the Djibouti Code of Conduct also contain references to various evidentiary thresholds, mainly reiterating the principles above contained in UNCLOS relevant to cooperation, rights of visit and liability for loss or damage.

In its recent Resolution 2077 (2012), approved after a significant debate on piracy as a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council renewed its call to continue the fight against piracy, including through the disposition of boats and other relevant equipment for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting their use in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea:

10. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;

Indeed, EUNAVFOR’s seizures or disposals of suspected pirate skiff are premised upon the standard of “reasonabile grounds to suspect” (see also here). How to interpret, therefore, this standard? Resolution 2077, issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, also makes various references to the need to ensure compliance with international law and more particularly, “applicable human rights law” and “due process of law in accordance with international standards” in the pursuit of accountability for suspected pirates (see also paras 16-18 and 20). A review of international human rights and criminal law, while concerning crimes of a different nature, might thus provide for futher guidance. Various standards exist and, admittedly, some differ from others by mere semantics. Article 58(1) of the ICC Statute, relevant to the issuing of a warrant of arrests, provides for the evidentiary threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe”. This is significantly different from the threshold required for the confirmation of charges against an individual under Article 61(7) of the same Statute (“substantial grounds to believe”) or, obviously, for a conviction under Article 66(3) (“beyond reasonable doubt”). “Reasonable grounds to believe” are also required before the ICTY for the submission of an indictment by the Prosecutor or in relation to contempt proceedings (Articles 47 and 77(c) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure, respectively). The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber equated the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard to the “reasonable suspicion” standard under Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Arguably, this comparaison appears questionable. Believing is a concept stronger than suspecting. However, while also relevant to arrest and detention, the ECHR determined that this standard consists of the existence of facts and information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed a crime. The procedure for the submission of an indictment before the ICTY provides the following description of the meaning of “reasonable grounds”:

Reasonable grounds point to such facts and circumstances as would justify a reasonable or ordinarily prudent man to believe that a suspect has committed a crime. To constitute reasonable grounds, facts must be such which are within the possession of the Prosecutor which raise a clear suspicion of the suspect being guilty of the crime. […] It is sufficient that the Prosecutor has acted with caution, impartiality and diligence as a reasonably prudent prosecutor would under the circumstances to ascertain the truth of his suspicions. It is not necessary that he has double checked every possible piece of evidence, or investigated the crime personally, or instituted an enquiry into any special matter. […] The evidence, therefore, need not be overly convincing or conclusive; it should be adequate or satisfactory to warrant the belief that the suspect has committed the crime. The expression “sufficient evidence” is thus not synonymous with “conclusive evidence” or “evidence beyond reasonable doubt.” (Review of the Indictment against Ivica Rajic, Decision of 29 August 1995, Case no. IT-95-12)

Given the limited role played by EUNAVFOR in the investigation and prosecution of piracy, perhaps reference to recent international commissions of inquiry, whose standards are generally lower than those of purely judicial institutions, might also provide for additional guidance. For instance, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur acted upon a standard of “reliable body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime” (para. 15).

Pirates or Fishermen? - Courtesy AP

Pirates or Fishermen? – Courtesy AP

Put plainly, the review above shows that a discrete amount of supporting evidence and the mere possibility, rather than the certainty, of the commission of a crime are therefore required to meet the “reasonable suspicion” standard encompassed in Resolution 2077 for the seizure and disposition of suspected pirate skiffs. It is, arguably, an extremely low standard but it demarcates the basic threshold for piracy-disruption activities. Suspecting the commission of a crime, however, falls a long way from having demonstrable proof. While this standard might also be akin to that required for the arrest of a suspected pirate, those necessary to proceed to his investigation and prosecution are increasingly higher and still depend upon factors such as the quantity and the quality of the evidence, as well as the willingness of State actors to proceed. Finally, several questions remain on the suitability and susceptibility of claims of unlawful destruction of vessels to be brought before Somali authorities when adequated grounds for such destruction are missing or in doubt.

UPDATE: Convictions in First Italy Piracy Trial

The 9 month-long piracy trial for the 2011 hijack of the Italian bulk carrier MV Montecristo, the first in Italian modern history, concluded last week in Rome with the conviction of all 9 Somali accused to prison terms of 16 and 19 years. We previously reported about this trial and Italy piracy laws here.

The accused were found guilty of attempted kidnapping for extortion and illegal possession of firearms. As the crime of kidnapping was only attempted, the maximum penalty range of 25 to 30 years of prison foreseen by the Italian criminal code was reduced by one third. During the trial, the accused unsuccessfully sought to be tried in the UK, in light of having been initially apprehended by UK forces, and challenged their transfer to Italian authorities. In accordance with Italian laws, the motivations for the verdict will be published within 3 months. All accused are likely to appeal the sentence, with some indicating to be ready to take the matter up to the European Court of Justice.

Interestingly, the prosecutors’ claim of the pirates connections with Al-Shabaab and the attack on the Montecristo being aimed at financing its terrorist activities and foster a campaign of obstruction of the free maritime transit in the Indian Ocean was rejected. Once again, this confirms the very tenuous links between the pirates’ business model and terrorism. In its latest report, the Monitoring Group on Somalia also found no evidence suggesting a structural or organizational link between Al-Shabaab and Somali pirate networks.

Another piracy trial will start on 4 December 2012, concerning the attempted hijack of the Italian oil tanker MV Valdarno on January 2012, off the Omani coast. The 11 Somalis charged with this attempted hijack opted for a plea bargain and are likely to receive a substantially reduced prison sentence.

Ahead of Security Council Debate, Secretary General Outlines Anti-Piracy Progress

As anticipated by Roger, on 19 November 2012 the UN Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on piracy as a threat to international peace and security. The meeting is called under the auspices of India’s current presidency. Earlier this month, the Council already approved the extension of the UN-AU joint military mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until March 2013, in another effort to provide continuity in security and governance to the current state authorities. Yet, the Council failed to reach an agreement on the funding of a maritime component for AMISOM. The Council also received the latest 3-montlhy report of the Sanctions Committee for Somalia. The briefing included an update on requests received by the Committee for exemptions to the on-going arms embargo on Somalia. It appears that calls by the African Union for a partial lifting of the arms embargo to strengthen Somalia’s poorly equipped military were so far unsuccessful.

Nigerian Troops Attached to AMISOM on Patrol in Mogadishu – Press TV

The upcoming debate will review the most recent UN Secretary General efforts to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden region, contained in his latest report on this matter. The report covers the most important activities relevant to the fight against piracy launched by or in cooperation with the UN following the Council’s Resolution 2020 last year. These include the progress in prosecution, detention and transfer of convicted pirates, the activity of the main UN bodies and of the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia, naval patrolling and anti-piracy capacity building in the region as well as a number of international conferences. Throughout the year, we have covered these issues here, here and here.

Interestingly, the report takes quite a direct stance on the impact of illegal fishing and illegal dumping toward piracy:

64.  Some observers continue to argue that illegal dumping of toxic waste and illegal fishing off the coast of Somalia is one of the factors responsible for forcing Somali youths to resort to piracy and attack foreign vessels because such activities deprive them from engaging in gainful employment opportunities. However, the United Nations has received little evidence to date to justify such claims. Most pirate attacks have been carried out against large merchant vessels several hundred nautical miles off the coast of Somalia.

65.  As for the dumping of toxic waste on land and at sea, while this may have occurred a few years ago in the waters off the coast of Somalia, there is no evidence of such activities currently. Concerns about the protection of the marine environment and resources should not be allowed to mask the true nature of piracy off the coast of Somalia, which is a transnational criminal enterprise driven primarily by the opportunity for financial gain.

The possibility for a specialized judicial structure solely devoted to investigate and prosecute piracy cases is also still gaining some momentum. The report refers to the initiative by Qatar for the establishment of a “special court for piracy” in the Gulf State (para. 42). As a first step, a delegation from UNODC and the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia visited Qatar last September for detailed discussions with the Qatari authorities. Additional initiatives pertain to a possible direct involvement of the UN in anti-piracy policing activities. The Asian Shipowners’ Forum called for the establishment of a multinational anti-piracy military task force under the auspices of the UN that could be deployed, a sort of UN Peacekeeping Vessel Protection Detachment on board of merchant ships (para. 43). These developments are not ripe for further exploration in the Secretary General report, but they raise fascinating preliminary legal issues. For instance, on the jurisdiction of special criminal fora, rule of law enforcement and the immunity of peacekeepers in connection with the prevention and punishment of universal jurisdiction crimes, that are worth considering for discussion in the near future.

Unused Pirate Skiffs in the Somali Town of Hobyo – AP

The most updated figures show a significant drop of both attempted and successful piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden and the larger Indian Ocean area, speaking volume of the regional, international, government-lead as well as the private industry’s efforts in combating piracy. With the end of the monsoon season and the possible risk of disengagement by the international community as Somalia continues its current path of democratization, the jury is still out on how effective these efforts have been and what, if any, the pirates’ next move will be. These concerns are addressed in the report, which also recalls the need to add focus on land-based solutions to piracy:

74.  The recent gains made by the international community in its collective fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia are encouraging. However, although there are signs of progress, they can be easily reversed. Until the root causes of piracy, namely, instability, lawlessness and a lack of effective governance in Somalia, are addressed, counter-piracy efforts must not be minimized. In particular, ongoing efforts to build the rule of law and livelihood opportunities ashore should be intensified.

75.  A significant gap still exists in land-based programmes in Somalia to address piracy. This is primarily owing to the lack of security on the ground and lack of sufficient funding to support capacity-building and alternative livelihoods. An ever greater emphasis must now be placed on providing focused assistance to States in the region and to authorities in Somalia to build their capacity to deal with the institutional and operational challenges to governance, the rule of law, maritime law enforcement and security, and economic growth. In addition, counter-piracy actions should run alongside a concerted effort to rebuild the civil structures and institutions of Somalia in close cooperation with the Somali authorities and civil society.

76.  The successful end of the political transition in Somalia should act as a catalyst to address the root causes of piracy. I encourage the new Government to develop a comprehensive national counter-piracy strategy, working closely with the regional administrations and neighbouring States. This should include efforts to facilitate the development of skills necessary to earn sustainable incomes in such sectors as agriculture, livestock, fisheries and industry. I also call upon the Somali authorities to adopt appropriate counter-piracy legislation without further delay to ensure the effective prosecution of individuals suspected of piracy and to facilitate the transfer of prosecuted individuals elsewhere to Somalia. The new Government should proclaim an exclusive economic zone off the Somali coast in accordance with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

77.  Although pirates’ proceeds decreased significantly in 2012 owing to a lower number of executed attacks, militias and parallel illicit activities sponsored by pirate money will continue to pose a threat to the stability and security of Somalia. It is imperative that pressure on Somali pirates and their business model be maintained.

The current lull in piracy activity in Somalia is, however, matched by a growing rise of violent robbery-style pirate attacks in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea, often connected with other illicit activities of a transmaritime and transnational nature. The Security Council already held an open debate on piracy in West Africa in October 2011. For the first time, the upcoming debate within the Security Council will provide the opportunity for a joint and integrated discussion on piracy in both East and West Africa. Hopefully, it will also be capable to provide for an opportunity to confront these differing realities, identify their root causes and peculiarities and, most importantly, share the relevant lessons learned on the ground so far. We will closely follow the debate and report on its achievements, or failures, as soon as possible.

Update: Mekong Pirates Sentenced to Death

Further to his earlier conviction for the murder of 13 chinese sailors on the Mekong River last year, notorious former druglord Naw Kham has been sentenced to death today by the Intermediate People’s Court of Kunming, in China’s Yunnan province. We blogged on the Mekong River murders here. The incident was one of the deadliest assaults on Chinese nationals overseas and prompted unprecedented joint boat patrols along the river.

Naw Kham Upon His Transfer from Laos to China for Trial in May this Year – Asian Correspondent

Three of Naw Kham’s gang members were also sentenced to death, another received a  suspended death sentence while one was sentenced to eight years in prison, respectively. They had all pleaded guilty on a 3-day long trial in September this year. We previously blogged about the Mekong Trial here. The defendants were also ordered  to pay compensations to the victims families. They all said they will appeal the verdict.