When the Use of Force is Lawfull: The 100 Series Rules are Released

May 5, 2013 by 1 Comment

After a lengthy incubation process, the 100 Series Rules have finally been released. Courtesy of the author, David Hammond, we have obtained a copy here.

The Logo of the 100 Series Rules

The Logo of the 100 Series Rules for the Use of Force

The 100 Series Rules are an international model standard and example benchmark of best practice for the use of force in the maritime security and anti-piracy fields for application by privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) and private maritime security companies (PMSCs) on board ships.

The Rules are set out for the benefit of the Master, Ship owner, charterer, insurer, underwriters, PMSCs, PCASP and interested third parties, providing guidance on lawful graduated response measures and lawful use of force, including lethal force, in accordance with the right of self-defence in the context of maritime piracy, armed robbery or hijacking. The Rules aim to provide for transparency of rules, clarity in use and accountability of actions in those situations, and hope to fill gaps in these areas often lamented by the stakeholders of maritime industry and maritime security.

The 100 Series Rules have been developed for the benefit of the entire maritime industry and under-pinned by a thorough public international and criminal law legal review of what is “reasonable and necessary” when force is used, as a lawful last resort, in self-defence.

Further details about the 100 Series Rules can be found at www.100seriesrules.com.

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EUCAP NESTOR: Bolstering the Rule of Law to Counter Piracy in the Horn of Africa – Interview with David HAMMOND

March 7, 2013 by 1 Comment

David HAMMONDFollowing retirement for the UK Royal Marines as a former frontline operator and then latterly as a naval barrister (Counsel), David Hammond was instructed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be the UK representative and lead lawyer for the planning, establishment and delivery of the €40m European Union’s “NESTOR” Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) Counter-Piracy Legal Advisory Programme for East Africa. As part of the advance planning team, David gained unique and valuable experience throughout East Africa, including in Somalia and where he led the legal liaison with the Somaliland and Puntland authorities at Ministerial and Attorney-General level. David successfully delivered the NESTOR Legal Advisory Programme, involving the establishment of significant rule of law programmes and which he headed up until June 2012.

As the Horn of Africa slowly progresses from a strategy of immediate counter-piracy to a strategy of post-piracy development, David kindly accepted our invitation to respond to a few questions on NESTOR’s mandate and operation. The following answers are provided on the basis that they are correct to the best of his current knowledge.

• What is EUCAP NESTOR main role in tackling piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean and, in particular, what are its main thematic areas of operation?

As per the EU Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP of 16 July 2012, the objective of EUCAP NESTOR is to assist the development in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States of a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of their maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance. EUCAP NESTOR will have initial geographic focus on Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia. EUCAP NESTOR will also be deployed in Tanzania, following receipt by the Union of an invitation from the Tanzanian authorities.

In order to achieve the objective, the tasks of EUCAP NESTOR were identified as being:

(a) assist authorities in the region in achieving the efficient organisation of the maritime security agencies carrying out the coast guard function;

(b) deliver training courses and training expertise to strengthen the maritime capacities of the States in the region, initially Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles, with a view to achieving self-sustainability in training;

(c) assist Somalia in developing its own land-based coastal police capability supported by a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework;

(d) identify priority equipment capability gaps and provide assistance in addressing them, as appropriate, to meet the objective of EUCAP NESTOR;

(e) provide assistance in strengthening national legislation and the rule of law through a regional legal advisory programme, and legal expertise to support the drafting of maritime security and related national legislation;

(f) promote regional cooperation between national authorities responsible for maritime security;

(g) strengthen regional coordination in the field of maritime capacity building;

(h) provide strategic advice through the assignment of experts to key administrations;

(i) implement mission projects and coordinate donations;

(j) develop and conduct a regional information and communication strategy.

• Why the creation of a mission with such peculiar mandate in the Horn of Africa setting?

At that time, and as far as I was aware, it was determined that in concert with various other on-going counter-piracy initiatives, including military action by EUNAVFOR, established work by EU delegations alongside the IMO, UNODC piracy programme and the likes of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, that a land-based regional programme which imparted expert knowledge and training to judicial, constabulary and other engaged entities throughout the Horn of Africa was the most efficient and effect method of assisting with the suppression of the piracy threat. Bolstering the effectiveness of the rule of law throughout affected areas was also seen as being of key importance in assisting with regional political stability.

Hargeysa Secure Hotel and Compound - Courtesy of David Hammond

Hargeysa Secure Hotel and Compound – Courtesy of David Hammond


• What are, therefore, the main differences in the mandates of EUCAP Nestor and EUNAVFOR and how these coordinate their respective activities?

NESTOR, as described, focuses on the imparting of expert constabulary, judicial, coastguard and logistical knowledge by Member State subject matter experts through training courses. This is separate to, but compliments the military presence provided for by EUNAVFOR alongside the on-going initiatives led by the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa.

• What is the current status of EUCAP Nestor deployment and what will be its overall structure and geographic area of operation?

I understand that at the moment staff are currently deployed to three countries: Djibouti (Mission Headquarters), the Republic of the Seychelles and Kenya. They will operate in those countries, plus Somalia and which will be the main focus. Tanzania has been asked to participate but so far has not invited the mission to carry out work there. The mission is mandated to run for 2 years commencing from 16 Jul 2012 and is headed up by Jacques Launay.

• What were the most challenging aspects in EUCAP Nestor set up and preliminary deployment process, given its geographic and thematic breadth?

The lasting memory I have in relation to the initial stages of the pre-deployment planning for the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) and subsequent drafting of the Concept of Operations which led to the Operational plan (OPLAN), was the positive drive and collegiate Member State political will in Brussels to make the operation work. This meant significant and sustained drafting, revision and constant presentational updates to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) from what was a small team, as set against the enormity of the task which then faced us. This was undertaken in a structured, collegiate and team-focused manner with many long days and nights spent brain-storming the successive issues that arose. This was undertaken with significant levels of professionalism from selected Member State individuals who had previously never before worked together and this often required a ready sense of humour from all of us.

For my part, once deployed in the Horn of Africa, the issue of establishing a new rule of law and legal advisory programme sat with me due to the limited size of the team. The TAM ran for over one month in total and involved multiple visits to five States by all team members. There was continuous ‘hot’ planning, setting up of meetings on the sour of the moment and exploiting every opportunity to meet key in-country stakeholders. It was what I would call “quick and dirty planning and mission development” and which proved most successful.

The biggest challenge was, in my mind, to achieve local buy-in for our mission and its purpose. This meant that I needed to identify and seek out the key decision makers at every stage and convince them of the benefits of the EU mission and especially of the merits of the Legal Advisory Programme.

Meeting with Puntland Attorney General - Courtesy of David Hammond

Meeting with Puntland Attorney General – Courtesy of David Hammond

 

The most striking mission development work for the Legal Advisory Programme that I undertook, was in Somaliland and Puntland alongside the judicial and ministerial authorities. This included being present at piracy trials in the Garowe court and spending time in discussion with the Attorney General, before going on to meet with the Chief Justice and Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs for Puntland. The issue of extending the rule of law into the coastal areas, as well as support within the IDP camps for education in terms of women’s rights and humanitarian law was of particular note and interest for me. Subsequently, I was able to draft the individual programmes that would assist in some of those areas of articulated need and which was most gratifying. In Somaliland, the essence of the interactions were the same in terms of seeking out areas in which we could assist the authorities with the development of the rule of law through imparting knowledge via training and advisory roles.

• Current available data shows that piracy attacks in Somalia are diminishing. Is this the result of the international community efforts to combat piracy and what impact will this have on the continuation of such efforts, particularly the full implementation of EUCAP Nestor mandate? 

I am informed that the decrease in attacks is due to a variety of factors, including: EUNAVFOR’s ATALANTA operation and other naval operations, greater use of PSCs, greater use of best practices to avoid risks as well as improved information sharing. However, I am informed that this reduction is probably fragile and could be reversed without careful oversight. As such, the environment in which EUCAP NESTOR was envisaged to act has changed, but arguably there is now an even greater need for the mission as the success of reducing piracy at sea has opened the possibility of doing even more to create security and stability on land, which will provide the conditions for a lasting reduction in piracy.

David Hammond can be contacted at:

david.hammond@9bedfordrow.co.uk

http://www.9bedfordrow.co.uk/members/David_Hammond

http://uk.linkedin.com/in/davideuanhammond

Filed under Somalia Tagged with , , , , , , , , , ,

Liability for the Destruction of Suspected Pirate Skiffs?

January 4, 2013 by 1 Comment

In one of their latest reported joint anti-piracy operation, EUNAVFOR and Combined Task Force 151 announced the disruption of potential piracy attacks off the Somali coast. In November 2012, the Romanian frigate ROS Regele Ferdinand, under EUNAVFOR command, and Turkish warship TCG Gemlik, of Combined Task Force 151, apprehended nine suspected pirates at sea off the coast of Somalia. Earlier, a Swedish EUNAVFOR maritime patrol aircraft located the skiff at 420 nautical miles east of Mogadishu, an area known for pirate activities. At the scene, the TGC Gemlik sent a boarding team to intercept and search the suspected vessel, which for over an hour tried to evade capture. The suspected pirates were then embarked onto the ROS Regele Ferdinand for futher questioning and evidence collection to assess the possibility of their prosecution. No fishing supplies were found on board, while it remains unclear whether the suspects were armed. Shortly after their apprehension, the suspected pirates were released onto a Somali beach for lack of sufficient evidence to proceed to their prosecution. According to EUNAVFOR, despite the strong suspicion that it was a pirate boat, it was determined that there was not sufficient evidence to build a case and prosecute the suspected pirates, as they were not caught actually committing any crime. In additon, building a case against the suspects would be too time-consuming and onerous.

German frigate Hamburg sinks an abandoned skiff off the coast of Somalia. Credit: Christian Bundeswehr - Reuters

German frigate Hamburg sinks an abandoned skiff off the coast of SomaliaCredit: Christian Bundeswehr – Reuters

However, their skiff and other effects on board, including fuel and ladders, were instead destroyed. According to EUNAVFOR, this will prevent the suspected pirates from using the skiff to attack ships in the future. By means of example, this incident, by no means uncommon, raises the question of the diffferent evidentiary grounds and standards of proof for the prosecution of suspected pirates and the destruction of boats and equipment belonging to them. While the destruction of a pirate vessel can prevent the perpetration of further piracy attacks, the sinking of a fishing boat, however small, might put a strain to the fishermen’s livelihoods. Article 106 of UNCLOS (and Article 110(3)) provides for the possible liability for any loss or damange caused by the seizure of a suspected pirate ship when effected without adequate grounds.

Liability for seizure without adequate grounds

Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.

What are the grounds for the seizure and destruction of suspected pirate vessels and how do these differ from those provided for the arrest and prosecution of suspected pirates? In this regard, the legal framework applicable to the contrast to piracy, particularly in Somalia, needs some additional clarification and interpretation. UNCLOS explicitly provides only for a right of visit when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a ship is engaged in piracy (Article 110) and for a right of hot pursuit of a ship into the high seas only when there are good reasons to believe that a violation was committed (Article 111). The SUA Convention, its additional protocol, as well as the Djibouti Code of Conduct also contain references to various evidentiary thresholds, mainly reiterating the principles above contained in UNCLOS relevant to cooperation, rights of visit and liability for loss or damage.

In its recent Resolution 2077 (2012), approved after a significant debate on piracy as a threat to international peace and security, the Security Council renewed its call to continue the fight against piracy, including through the disposition of boats and other relevant equipment for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting their use in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea:

10. Renews its call upon States and regional organizations that have the capacity to do so, to take part in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, in particular, consistent with this resolution and international law, by deploying naval vessels, arms and military aircraft and through seizures and disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, or for which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting such use;

Indeed, EUNAVFOR’s seizures or disposals of suspected pirate skiff are premised upon the standard of “reasonabile grounds to suspect” (see also here). How to interpret, therefore, this standard? Resolution 2077, issued under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, also makes various references to the need to ensure compliance with international law and more particularly, “applicable human rights law” and “due process of law in accordance with international standards” in the pursuit of accountability for suspected pirates (see also paras 16-18 and 20). A review of international human rights and criminal law, while concerning crimes of a different nature, might thus provide for futher guidance. Various standards exist and, admittedly, some differ from others by mere semantics. Article 58(1) of the ICC Statute, relevant to the issuing of a warrant of arrests, provides for the evidentiary threshold of “reasonable grounds to believe”. This is significantly different from the threshold required for the confirmation of charges against an individual under Article 61(7) of the same Statute (“substantial grounds to believe”) or, obviously, for a conviction under Article 66(3) (“beyond reasonable doubt”). “Reasonable grounds to believe” are also required before the ICTY for the submission of an indictment by the Prosecutor or in relation to contempt proceedings (Articles 47 and 77(c) of the ICTY Rules of Procedure, respectively). The ICC Pre-Trial Chamber equated the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard to the “reasonable suspicion” standard under Article 5(1)(c) of the European Convention on Human Rights. Arguably, this comparaison appears questionable. Believing is a concept stronger than suspecting. However, while also relevant to arrest and detention, the ECHR determined that this standard consists of the existence of facts and information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed a crime. The procedure for the submission of an indictment before the ICTY provides the following description of the meaning of “reasonable grounds”:

Reasonable grounds point to such facts and circumstances as would justify a reasonable or ordinarily prudent man to believe that a suspect has committed a crime. To constitute reasonable grounds, facts must be such which are within the possession of the Prosecutor which raise a clear suspicion of the suspect being guilty of the crime. […] It is sufficient that the Prosecutor has acted with caution, impartiality and diligence as a reasonably prudent prosecutor would under the circumstances to ascertain the truth of his suspicions. It is not necessary that he has double checked every possible piece of evidence, or investigated the crime personally, or instituted an enquiry into any special matter. […] The evidence, therefore, need not be overly convincing or conclusive; it should be adequate or satisfactory to warrant the belief that the suspect has committed the crime. The expression “sufficient evidence” is thus not synonymous with “conclusive evidence” or “evidence beyond reasonable doubt.” (Review of the Indictment against Ivica Rajic, Decision of 29 August 1995, Case no. IT-95-12)

Given the limited role played by EUNAVFOR in the investigation and prosecution of piracy, perhaps reference to recent international commissions of inquiry, whose standards are generally lower than those of purely judicial institutions, might also provide for additional guidance. For instance, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur acted upon a standard of “reliable body of material consistent with other verified circumstances, which tends to show that a person may reasonably be suspected of being involved in the commission of a crime” (para. 15).

Pirates or Fishermen? - Courtesy AP

Pirates or Fishermen? – Courtesy AP

Put plainly, the review above shows that a discrete amount of supporting evidence and the mere possibility, rather than the certainty, of the commission of a crime are therefore required to meet the “reasonable suspicion” standard encompassed in Resolution 2077 for the seizure and disposition of suspected pirate skiffs. It is, arguably, an extremely low standard but it demarcates the basic threshold for piracy-disruption activities. Suspecting the commission of a crime, however, falls a long way from having demonstrable proof. While this standard might also be akin to that required for the arrest of a suspected pirate, those necessary to proceed to his investigation and prosecution are increasingly higher and still depend upon factors such as the quantity and the quality of the evidence, as well as the willingness of State actors to proceed. Finally, several questions remain on the suitability and susceptibility of claims of unlawful destruction of vessels to be brought before Somali authorities when adequated grounds for such destruction are missing or in doubt.

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Historic Piracy Trial Opens in Italy

March 27, 2012 by 1 Comment

Another landmark piracy trial involving alleged Somali pirates opened on 23 March 2012 in Rome. The trial is the first international piracy trial taking place in Italy, mirroring similar trials already held in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the US, among others, in addition to “regional prosecutions” in the Seychelles and neighboring States in the Gulf of Aden. This trial provides a perfect opportunity to examine the interplay of international and municipal law as Italy has incorporated in its own fashion the relevant provisions of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention.

Factual Background – Citadel Saves Seafarers

Before reaching these legal provisions, it is important to have an understanding of the rich factual tapestry underlying this case. Nine suspected Somali pirates have appeared before the Court d’Assise of Rome in connection with the 10 October 2011 attack and highjack of the Montecristo, an Italian-owned cargo vessel, some 600 miles off the Somali Coast. At the time of the attack, the Montecristo was en route to Yemen transporting scrap iron from Liverpool, UK to Vietnam, The vessel’s twenty-three men crew was composed of Italians, Indians and Ukrainians. Among the seven Italians on board were four civilians with security tasks, although unarmed.

According to media reports on the incident, the pirates approached the Montecristo from two skiffs and a mothership, firing at the vessel before successfully boarding it. The vessel’s crew immediately sought refuge in a fortified citadel, from which it could control the engine and continue steering. Some 24 hours after the attack, the Montecristo and its crew were rescued by UK and US troops in a NATO Ocean Shield operation. The then Italian Minister of Defence has since indicated that, prior to the security blitz, Italy agreed with UK authorities to detain and try the perpetrators before its national courts. Despite the pirates managing to cut off the vessel’s means of communication, the crew was able to communicate with the naval authorities, apparently tossing a message in a bottle attached to a flashing beacon. With the crew out of harms’ way, the RFA auxiliary ship Fort Victoria and USS frigate De Wert headed to the rescue, launching a helicopter raid from the former. Eleven suspected pirates were found on board and surrendered without opposing any resistance. Four other suspects were later intercepted 200 miles off the Somali coast on an Iranian dhow deemed to be the pirate mothership from which the attack on the Montecristo was launched. Twenty Pakistani members of the hostage crew manning the hijacked dhow for the pirates were freed. Ladders and weapons were also found on board,  including a rocket-propelled grenade as well as life jackets from the Asphalt Venture, a Panama-flagged ship previously hijacked in 2010 and released after payment of a ransom. All fifteen suspected pirates were handed over to Italian authorities and their arrest confirmed. During the judicial investigation into the incident, two suspects from Pakistan were found to have been also previously kidnapped by pirates. They were therefore released by the Italian authorities.

Prosecutors have charged the alleged pirates with depredation and damage to a foreign vessel, kidnapping and illegal possession of weapons. According to the prosecutors, the pirates have connections with Al-Shabaab and the attack on the Montecristo was aimed at financing its terrorist activities and foster a campaign of obstruction of the free maritime transit in the Indian Ocean. The Italian government is participating in the trial as a civil party not only to emphasize the gravity of modern day piracy as communis hostis omnium but also to highlight its relevant social and economic costs vis a vis security and other prevention and deterrence measures. The trial will continue on 15 May 2012 with the testimony of the Montecristo’s captain as well as the captain of the Iranian dhow. The remaining four alleged pirates were previously found to be below 18 years of age and their case was therefore transferred to the juvenile courts. Their trial will commence on 2 April 2012, also in Rome, and will hopefully shed light on the phenomenon of the involvement and use of juveniles as pirates.

Notably, the highjack of the Montecristo triggered the deployment of military forces onboard Italian merchant ships as Vessel Protection Detachment to protect these against pirate attacks. Law N. 130 of 2 August 2001 allows for the deployment of both army personnel as well as contractors onboard commercial ships. As widely reported, two Italian marines on duty aboard the container ship Enrica Lexie are currently detained in Kerala, India in connection with the murder of two Indian fishermen during the shooting of a suspected pirate boat in the Indian Ocean. In 2005, Italy was the first nation to deploy one of its military ships off the Somali coasts, the frigate Granatiere, with anti-piracy tasks. Contrary to an increasing number of other States, Italy did not fully implement the provisions of L. 130/11 allowing privately contracted armed security guards on board of merchant ships operating under its flag. Previously, 2 Italian-flagged ships, the oil tanker Savina Caylyn and the cargo ship Rosalia D’Amato were captured by Somali pirates and released only after the payment of ransoms.

Italian Anti-Piracy Legislation

In connection with the holding of these trials, it is worth highlighting the main anti-piracy norms currently in force in Italy with regard to piracy and armed robbery at sea. Italy ratified the 1982 UNCLOS by means of Law N. 689 of 2 December 1994 which also gives full execution to the Convention on Italian soil. Italy also ratified and gave full execution to the SUA Convention, adopted in Rome on 10 March 1988, with Law N. 422 of 28 December 1989. Article 3 of L. 422/89 introduced various terms of imprisonment for the crimes contained in the Convention. Italy first criminalized piracy by adopting its Navigation Code back in 1942. Articles 1135-39 of the Italian Navigation Code contain the relevant regime for the criminalization of piracy within the Italian judicial system. Notably, Articles 1135 provides as follows (unofficial translation):

Art. 1135 – Piracy

1.   The Master or Officer of a national or foreign ship, who commits acts of depredation against a national or foreign ship or its load, or for the purpose of depredation commits violence against any person on board, shall be punished with a term of imprisonment from ten to twenty years.

2.   For all the others members of the crew, punishment is reduced by a maximum not exceeding one third; for those individuals extraneous to the crew, the punishment is reduced to the maximum of a half.

Article 1136 is particularly interesting, criminalizing the suspicion of piracy where a ship is illegally equipped with weapons while lacking proper navigation papers:

Art. 1136 – Ship on Suspicion of Piracy

1.   The Master or Officer of a national or foreign ship, illegally equipped with weapons, who sails without proper certification, shall be punished with imprisonment from five to ten years.

2.   Para. 2 from art. n. 1135 applies.

This Article, although rarely utilized, does not find immediate comparison within the UNCLOS provisions relevant to the repression of piracy. As elucidated below, its applicability is relevant as a matter of municipal legislation pursuant to the norms enshrined in Article 7 of the Italian Penal Code. Question arises, yet, on the basis of which national legislation, particularly when concerning Somali pirates, the illegality of weapon possession shall be assessed. Article 1137 instead refers to crimes committed within the Italian territorial seas and is relevant for the punishment of armed robbery at sea. Articles 1138-39 are also worth mentioning, criminalizing not only the seizure of a ship or an agreement to this end, respectively, but also providing for a harsher punishment regime for those who promote these acts.

Considering the charges against the suspected pirates, the oldest of which is of twenty four years of age, it has also to be noted that under Article 289bis of the Italian Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping in connection with terrorism carries a possible sentence of twenty-five to thirty years of imprisonment.

In addition, Article 5 of Law Decree No. 209 of 30 December 2008, relevant to Italy’s participation to several humanitarian and peace enforcement missions, originally established a series of criminal sanctions with specific reference to international maritime piracy. In particular, it states that crimes referred to in Articles 1135-36 of the Italian Navigation Code, committed either on the High Seas or territorial waters and covered by the EU NAVFOR ATLANTA mission, are punished in accordance with Article 7 of the Italian Penal Code, which allows the punishment of certain crimes committed outside the Italian territory by foreigners or national citizens. Pursuant to L. 422/89, Article 7 also applies for crimes contemplated in the SUA Convention. In accordance with Law Decree N. 61 of 15 June 2009, to be punished under this Article, the crimes committed off the coast of Somalia need to retain a link with national interests, for instance damage to Italian citizens or property. Furthermore, territorial jurisdiction for these crimes resides in the Ordinary Tribunal based in Rome.

Finally, in case of arrest for these crimes, Article 5, L. 209/08 extends the provisions of Article 9, para. 5, of the Law Decree N. 421 of 1 December 2001, relevant to Italy’s participation in the chapter of the Enduring Freedom mission in the Horn of Africa. Article 9 provides for the applicability of stricter procedures in cases where it is not immediately possible to bring the arrested individuals before the competent judicial authorities for the confirmation of their arrest. These provisions include the possible extension of further 48 hours after formal notification of the arrest and the use of audio-video conference means for interrogation, confirmation of the arrest and access to a defence lawyer in the place of temporary detention.

How will the prosecution charges play out in the Montecristo trial? Particularly relevant appears the piracy-terrorism link, specifically in relation with the funding of Al Shabaab. In this regard, the trial might become the first major trial discussing the link between the activities of the pirates and those of the militias which has been since long theorized but never so far clearly established.

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A Globalized System of Criminal Justice

February 23, 2012 by Leave a comment

Piracy and armed robbery incidents reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2011. Map courtesy of International Chamber of Commerce.

Criminal Justice for pirates has become a truly global affair, utilizing diverse state resources to funnel pirates through a limited number of regional states in East Africa back to their homeland of Somalia. More specifically, the UN’s preferred option for prosecuting Somali pirates will be national prosecutions in several East African states (Seychelles, Mauritius, Kenya, Tanzania) as well as in several semi-autonomous regions of Somalia (Somaliland, Puntland).  Prosecution in European states and the US would remain a backup plan. But this is only one piece of the criminal justice apparatus. Police functions in the Indian Ocean will continue to be performed by a combination of naval coalitions such as NATO and EUNAVFOR and by individual naval states with interests in commercial shipping through the high-risk piracy corridor (including the motley crew of the U.S., India, China, Iran, and others).  At the other end of the criminal justice chain is the prison system where there is currently a bottleneck.  In this regard, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime is in the process of refurbishing and building new prisons in Somaliland and Puntland to house convicted pirates.

This solution has several benefits as compared with the other solutions outlined by Jack Lang in January 2011. Prosecuting pirates in multiple regional states creates redundancies, so that if one or more courts prove incapable of continuing prosecutions, other options remain available. For example, Kenya recently stopped all of its piracy prosecutions due to a High Court decision ruling Kenyan courts did not have jurisdiction over piracy offences. Likewise, the Seychelles recently refused to accept pirates from a Danish ship because there was no guarantee that the pirates, if convicted, could be sent back to Somalia (for lack of prison space) and because the Seychelles’ limited judicial capacity. In situations such as these, other states might serve as back-up solutions so that prosecutions could be directed elsewhere.

Funneling Pirates Back to Somalia

Another advantage of this proposed solution is that it has the benefit of building local capacity. Instead of directing resources into a foreign institution, providing support to local courts and local prosecutors promises to increase the capacity of regional state institutions to address criminal justice issues beyond piracy.

The report also raises hopes that the financiers and organizers of piracy can be adequately addressed by East African states. In relation to Mauritius and Seychelles in particular, the report highlights the capacity of these states to prosecute inchoate crimes such as conspiracy, incitement and attempts to commit piracy. The UK and the Netherlands are funding a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecutions Intelligence Co-ordination Centre (RAPPICC) in Seychelles, in part, for this purpose. This capability will be crucial in order to bring to justice those individuals who organize pirate enterprises, but never step foot on board a pirate vessel.

There will be heavy reliance on prisons in Puntland and Somaliland

However, the report and the plan are lacking in several respects.  First, the cost savings of this plan have likely been exaggerated. There is no final accounting provided in the UNSG report. But a cursory survey of the various costs associated with refurbishing courtrooms, providing expert assistance, hiring additional judges and prosecutors, conducting trainings and, especially building prisons, shows a quickly rising price tag. Combine this with additional unspecified costs that would likely accompany this proposal such as rule of law, general training, and governance projects and the costs may actually be about the same as a hybrid tribunal such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone or the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (about $40 million each annually). In any event, the proposed solution’s budget is modest compared with the sums that are currently being dumped into unsustainable solutions that fail to address the root of the problem.

In addition, the UNSG report apparently hazards some guesses as to the potential of its proposed course of action. Despite the different conditions in each country or region, the report indicates that Somaliland, Puntland, Kenya, and Mauritius will be capable of performing piracy investigations in 20 months and within two years would be able to prosecute 24 cases of 10 defendants each. These are good benchmarks to evaluate the success of these projects.  But it is hard to believe that they are realistic assessments of local conditions. The report evaluates the local capacities of each state/region indicating the number of prosecutors and judges in each. But it fails to compare these numbers of professionals to the actual populations that they must serve. Three hundred and five (305) Prosecutors in Tanzania seems to be a significant number compared to the 36 prosecutors for the whole of Somaliland. However, Tanzania’s population is 43.5 million and the population in Somaliland appears to be around 3.5 million. Therefore, the number of prosecutors per capita in Somaliland (1/10,000) is higher than in Tanzania (1/140,000). In addition, only 10 Tanzanian prosecutors would be in charge of piracy prosecutions. Likewise, the report fails to take into consideration the caseload of the respective prosecutorial groups that would be responsible for piracy prosecutions (i.e. the number of cases each attorney is responsible for, thereby dictating how much time they would have to devote to piracy cases). This suggests the projected capacities are not based upon a realistic assessment of current capacity.

More importantly, the report acknowledges that it was unable to predict with any accuracy the number of piracy cases that would likely proceed to trial. That is, how much prosecutorial and penal resources will likely be required in the next few years.  Due to the volatility of Somalia, the changing tactics of pirates and of commercial vessels responding with various self-defence measures, an accurate assessment in this regard is quite difficult. However, the report suggests that anticipating the numbers of piracy suspects likely to be apprehended at sea and transferred to regional states for prosecution was not possible because no information was available as to the reasons for the release of piracy suspects from the numerous states conducting naval anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean.  It is unclear why the UNSG was unable to obtain this information from various member states of the United Nations. But it has certainly left a conspicuous gap in the report’s findings.

Finally, the report ends without any recommendations as to how to prevent recidivism, including programs to retrain Somali prisoners and integrate them back into the community. In this regard, the proposed solution is short-sighted, enabling the relocation of pirates back to Somalia, but providing no real long-term preventative measures. The only permanent solution to piracy is a stable and economically prosperous Somalia. Hopefully, the London Conference can initiate positive reforms in this regard as it is widely accepted that the solution or piracy resides on land, and not at sea.

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