Report From the Piracy Contact Group, Working Group 2, Meeting in Copenhagen

Private Security Guards

Cross-posted at international law girls.

In my capacity as an independent academic, as well as a representative of the prominent non-governmental organization, the Public International Law and Policy Group, I had the honor of attending the 12th meeting of the United Nations Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Working Group 2, meeting in Copenhagen, on April 10-11.  I will take this opportunity to briefly summarize some of the key legal issues that were discussed in Copenhagen.

First, many nations seem to be moving in favor of authorizing the use of private security guards on board their merchant vessels.  The use of such private security guards is controversial, and many in the international community feel a general sense of discomfort any times states delegate their traditional duties to private entities.  Others have expressed the view that the use of private security guards on board merchant vessels should be allowed only under strictly delineated guidelines and rules on the use of force.  Contrary to popular belief, such guidelines and rules exist already.  Several International Maritime Organization Circulars provide guidance on matters related to the employment of private security personnel on board merchant vessels.  The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) has drafted and made publicly available a standard employment contract between a shipping company and private security providers.  BIMCO has also issued specific Guidance on the Rule of the Use of Force, which suggest under which circumstances private security personnel may use force, including lethal force, against suspected pirates.  The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) issued additional Guidance for private security personnel on board ships, as well as a pro forma contract.  Finally, the Montreux Document provides international law rules applicable to the conduct of private security providers during armed conflict.  Although this Document most likely does not apply to the Somali piracy context because of the absence of armed conflict, it nonetheless sheds light on the international community’s consensus regarding the international law responsibilities of private security providers, operating in a domain otherwise reserved to state powers.

In addition to the above-mentioned guidance, international treaty law provides rules regarding the master of a ship’s duties on the high seas, in a situation where a merchant vessel may be under attack by suspected pirates, regardless of the presence of private security contractors on board.  It is clear under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as under the SUA Convention that the master of a ship retains authority on board his or her vessel, that the master may order any private security personnel to cease using force against suspected pirates at any time, and that the delegation of power from the master to the private security personnel during a piracy incident is temporary.   The general sentiment in Copenhagen was that numerous existing guidelines, principles, and treaty law obligations apply to any use of private security personnel on board merchant vessels, and that states have plenty to work with when determining whether and how to authorize the use of private security on board their own vessels.

Second, states remain concerned with legal issues related to the treatment of juvenile pirates (I had previously reported on this issue from the last Working Group 2 meeting in September 2012).   In order to ensure that juvenile pirates are treated according to relevant human rights standards and practices, states have begun developing guidelines on the treatment of juvenile pirates.  Such guidelines include the necessity to segregate juvenile suspects from the general prison population, to provide educational and vocational opportunities for juveniles, and to generally rehabilitate them so that they re-enter society upon their release and engage in legal, as opposed to criminal, activities.  These proposed guidelines will remain the subject of future Working Group 2 meetings.

Third, states remain committed to the post-conviction transfer model: the idea that pirates, if they are successfully prosecuted and convicted in Kenya, the Seychelles, or Mauritius, will be transferred back to Somaliland or Puntland where they will serve their penal sentences.  This model is important for two reasons.  First, it relieves small capacity nations such as the Seychelles and Mauritius from having to detain convicted pirates for long period of time in their own prisons; prosecutorial nations can, under this model, accept more suspected pirates because they will not run out of detention space.  Second and more importantly, the post-conviction transfer model allows pirates to return home – although they will not be immediately freed upon re-entering their native land, they will presumably be reunited with their families through prison visits and return to their own communities after the end of their sentences.  Any post-conviction transfer requires the successful fulfillment of the following criteria: the applicant must be at least 18; he or she must waive any existing appeals (the sentence must be final); he or she must consent to the transfer; all relevant states, including the apprehending state, the transferring state, and the receiving state, must agree to the transfer.  As discussed in Copenhagen, the post-conviction transfer model has been used successfully thus far, and 59 pirates have been transferred to Somaliland and Puntland as of today.

Finally, states have expressed an important concern regarding hostages.  In many instances, pirate hostages spend months in captivity under very difficult conditions.  Once hostages are released, they may be confused, mentally or physically injured, and may have no meaningful way of returning to their home states.  Several states in Copenhagen expressed the view that it is important to create a hostage release program that would maintain contact with released hostages in order to enable them to successfully return to a normal life after captivity.

The work of Working Group 2 thus far has been outstanding.  It demonstrates that states can, through joint legal efforts and cooperation, contribute significantly to the global fight against Somali piracy.

Event: The Global Fight against Maritime Piracy – Learning Lessons from Somalia

Global Policy Journal and the Greenwich Maritime Institute are hosting a seminar on contemporary maritime piracy. This is the theme of a special section published in the February 2013 issue of Global Policy, edited by Dr Christian Bueger of Cardiff University.

The seminar will take place on April 17th from 18.00-20.00 in the Howe Lecture Theatre, Queen Anne Court, Greenwich Campus of Greenwich University. The event is free to attend and hosted by the Greenwich Maritime Institute.

The Global Fight against Maritime Piracy – Learning Lessons from Somalia

The fight against maritime piracy remains a crucial global challenge. Current incident numbers indicate that piracy in Eastern African waters is in decline and that the measures taken by the international community and the shipping industry have been effective. Yet, the global fight against piracy is not won. Questions have to be addressed how piracy can be contained and prevented in the long run, beyond the engagement of international naval forces. What are the lessons learned from our experience with Somali piracy? What help can be expected from development aid? How can state building assist maritime security? What role should navies have in ensuring good order at sea? What contributions can the transport industry make to prevent and contain piracy? What types of global and regional governance institutions will be required to prevent further outbreaks of piracy? The authors and panelists will address these and other questions based on their practical and academic expertise.

Confirmed panellists include Professor Christopher Bellamy, (Director of the Greenwich Maritime Institute) Dr Christian Bueger (Cardiff University), Dr Douglas Guilfoyle (University College London), Dr Axel Klein (University of Kent), Dr Anja Shortland (Brunel University), as well as representatives from the maritime security sector.

Piracy: Declining in the Gulf of Aden, Rising in the Gulf of Guinea

We are pleased to welcome Milena Sterio as a contributing author to Communis Hostis Omnium. She is an Associate Professor at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, where she teaches international law and international criminal law.  She has published numerous articles on the topic of maritime piracy, and she frequently lectures on this topic.  She is a member of the Piracy Working Group, an expert think tank founded by members of the prominent non-governmental organization, the Public International Law and Policy Group.  In her capacity as Piracy Working Group member, she traveled to the Seychelles and to Mauritius, where she consulted with local prosecutors and judges on best strategies toward successful national piracy prosecutions.

A crew member prepares to board a tanker that was hijacked by pirates in Benin on 24 July 2011. Photo: IRIN/Daniel Hayduk

Maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and elsewhere in the Indian Ocean appears to be on the decline.  In 2012, only 35 piracy attacks took place, compared to 163 attacks in 2009.  As of January 2013, Somali pirates were holding 4 large ships with an estimated 108 hostages.  In the past, the pirates had held dozens of ships and several hundred hostages at one time.  Some news reports indicate that many Somali pirates seem ready to abandon this once lucrative criminal endeavor.  Last year, Mohamed Abdi Hassan, a high-profile Somali pirate, was quoted as saying “I have given up piracy and succeeded in encouraging more youths to give up piracy.”

This decline in piratical activity off the east cost of the African continent is most likely due to several factors.  First, the Gulf of Aden and other waters of the Indian Ocean have been more heavily patrolled by joint maritime forces of several nations, including European Union and NATO-led fleets.  The presence of naval forces in these waters has deterred some pirates from attempting attacks on merchant ships.  Second, many merchant and passenger cruise ships sailing off the east coast of Africa have been staffed with armed security guards.  Statistics show that no successful pirate attack has ever occurred against a ship protected by armed guards.  Third, Somali pirates seemed to engage in the crime of piracy because it represented a lucrative business opportunity, which posed minimal risk and promised tens of thousands of dollars in financial gains.  Today, piracy is a more risky endeavor, because of the presence of naval fleets in the Indian Ocean as well as armed guards aboard ships.  Thus, Somali pirates may seem willing to abandon this criminal enterprise in order to possibly explore other kinds of opportunities.

Yet, although piracy seems to be declining off the east coast of Africa, the opposite is true for the west coast of the African continent.  Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, home to major oil-producing states such as Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Ghana, has been on the rise.  34 piracy incidents were recorded between January and September 2012, up from thirty in 2011. Togo reported more attacks in 2012 than in the previous five years combined, with three vessels hijacked, two boarded and six attempted attacks.  Piracy has also been on the rise in Benin.  In addition, Nigeria reported over twenty attacks in 2012.  And on February 3, 2013, a French oil tanker was reported missing off the Ivory Coast; according to the International Maritime Bureau, the ship was probably pirated off the shores of Nigeria.

The piracy model in the Gulf of Guinea resembles its counterpart in the Gulf of Aden in terms of the pirates’ modus operandi: in West Africa, pirates sail out to the sea on larger vessels but then launch attacks using smaller skiffs.  In addition, pirates in West Africa seem to be resorting to this crime because of factors similar to those that have existed in Somalia for several decades: insecurity, poverty, as well as a lack of education and employment opportunities.  However, while Somali pirates seemed mostly after collecting ransoms from shipping companies in exchange for the crew and cargo, pirates in West Africa seem more interested in keeping the cargo (mostly oil) of any successful hijacking operations, which they then sell on the black market.  Reports also indicate that pirates in the Gulf of Guinea are more prone to violence, and that they act in more brutal ways toward the captured crewmembers.  And because the Gulf of Guinea is a rich oil-producing region, its strategic importance, and thus the necessity of curbing the rising piracy threat, may be even greater than the piracy menace in the Gulf of Aden had ever been.

Unsurprisingly, like in the case of Somali piracy, the United Nations Security Council has become involved in finding solutions for this developing regional crisis.  On February 29, 2012, the Security Council adopted resolution 2039 calling on the Secretary-General to “support efforts towards mobilising resources following the creation of the regional strategy to assist in building national and regional capacities in close consultation with states and regional and extraregional organizations.”  Furthermore, on October 31, 2012, the United Nations Security Council, in resolution 2018, condemned all acts of maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea and encouraged states in the region to work together toward a comprehensive response to the menace of piracy.  The Security Council, in this unanimously adopted resolution, encouraged several regional organizations (the Council encouraged the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC)) to jointly develop a strategy against maritime piracy.  Such joint strategy could entail the drafting of more comprehensive domestic laws which would criminalize piracy and armed robbery at sea, as well as the development of an information-sharing regional center.  Moreover, the regional anti-piracy efforts could include the development of domestic laws which would implement international agreements existing in the field of international maritime law.  In addition, ECOWAS, ECCAS and GGC could engage in bilateral or regional maritime patrols in the Gulf of Guinea, in order to ensure the safety of maritime navigation and thwart potential piratical attacks.  Finally, the Security Council urged member states of ECOWAS, ECCAS, and GGC to cooperate with other states, such as states where ships are registered, and states where victims or perpetrators come from, in the prosecution of pirates as well as of piracy facilitators and financiers, in accordance with applicable international law.   The Security Council thus encouraged all states in the international community to assist countries in the region in strengthening anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.

Like the Security Council, the Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has also expressed his intention to focus on the piracy problem in the Gulf of Guinea, by deploying a United Nations assessment mission to the region in order to explore options on how to best address the problem.  According to the Secretary-General, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea could hinder economic development and undermine security in the region.

Within the next few months, the Security Council expects a briefing from Said Djinnit, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative and head of the UN Office for West Africa (UNOWA), on the Secretary-General’s semi-annual report, including an update on the Gulf of Guinea piracy problem.  The international community will have hopefully learned from the Gulf of Aden piracy epidemic, which seems to have been successfully curbed through coordinated international maritime efforts, that anti-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea will similarly require international and regional strategy and a comprehensive anti-piracy plan.

Upcoming Event: “Counter Piracy – Rules for the Use of Force” Conference in London, UK

The international conference “Counter Piracy – Rules for the Use of Force” will take place in London, UK on 8 February 2013. The event aims to bring together various stakeholders in the anti-piracy field, including maritime lawyers, flag States, ship-owners and shipping  associations, insurance companies and P&I Clubs as well as maritime security companies and other interested parties. The main topic of discussion will be the legal framework relevant to the use of force by privately contracted security personnel in the maritime industry, particularly the status of the so called “100 Series Rules”.

The 100 Series Rules, developed by David Hammond, aim to be an international model standard and example benchmark of best practice for the use of force in the maritime and anti-piracy field for application by privately contracted armed security personnel and private maritime security companies. Further details about the 100 Series Rules can be found at www.100seriesrules.com.

Italian Marines to be tried in Special Court in Delhi for Enrica Lexie Incident

The two Italian Marines to be put on trial before a special court in Delhi

India’s Supreme Court has rejected a bid by the Italian government to transfer to Italy the case of two of its marines charged with the murder of two Indian fishermen. The judges said that the marines would be tried in a special court in the capital, Delhi. As previously discussed here and here, in the Enrica Lexie incident Indian fishermen were shot and killed by an Italian Vessel Protection Detachment on board to protect against pirates operating in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden. Jurisdiction over the incident was contested by Italy and India leading to litigation before the Supreme Court of India which has now pronounced its view. A friend of the blog has provided us the Judgement of the Supreme Court.  Here are the crucial paragraphs:

97. In my view, since India is a signatory, she is obligated to respect the provisions of UNCLOS 1982, and to apply the same if there is no conflict with the domestic law. In this context, both the countries may have to subject themselves to the provisions of Article 94 of the Convention which deals with the duties of the Flag State and, in particular, sub-Article (7) which provides that each State shall cause an inquiry to be held into every marine casualty or incident of navigation on the high seas involving a ship flying its flag and causing loss of life or serious injury to nationals of another State. It is also stipulated that the Flag State and the other State shall cooperate in the conduct of any inquiry held by that other State into any such marine casualty or incident of navigation.

98. The principles enunciated in the Lotus case (supra) have, to some extent, been watered down by Article 97 of UNCLOS 1982. Moreover, as observed in Starke’s International Law, referred to by Mr. Salve, the territorial criminal jurisdiction is founded on various principles which provide that, as a matter of convenience, crimes should be dealt with by the States whose social order is most closely affected. However, it has also been observed that some public ships and armed forces of foreign States may enjoy a degree of immunity from the territorial jurisdiction of a nation.

99. This brings me to the question of applicability of the provisions of the Indian Penal Code to the case in hand, in view of Sections 2 and 4 thereof. Of course, the applicability of Section 4 is no longer in question in this case on account of the concession made on behalf of the State of Kerala in the writ proceedings before the Kerala High Court. However, Section 2 of the Indian Penal Code as extracted hereinbefore provides otherwise. Undoubtedly, the incident took place within the Contiguous Zone over which, both under the provisions of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, and UNCLOS 1982, India is entitled to exercise rights of sovereignty. However, as decided by this Court in the Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd. Case (supra), referred to by Mr. Salve, Sub-section (4) of Section 7 only provides for the Union of India to have sovereign rights limited to exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of the natural resources, both living and non-living, as well as for producing energy from tides, winds and currents, which cannot be equated with rights of sovereignty over the said areas, in the Exclusive Economic Zone. It also provides for the Union of India to exercise other ancillary rights which only clothes the Union of India with sovereign rights and not rights of sovereignty in the Exclusive Economic Zone. The said position is reinforced under Sections 6 and 7 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, which also provides that India’s sovereignty extends over its Territorial Waters while, the position is different in respect of the Exclusive Economic Zone. I am unable to accept Mr. Banerji’s submissions to the contrary to the effect that Article 59 of the Convention permits States to assert rights or jurisdiction beyond those specifically provided in the Convention.

100. What, therefore, transpires from the aforesaid discussion is that while India is entitled both under its Domestic Law and the Public International Law to exercise rights of sovereignty up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline on the basis of which the width of Territorial Waters is measured, it can exercise only sovereign rights within the Exclusive Economic Zone for certain purposes. The incident of firing from the Italian vessel on the Indian shipping vessel having occurred within the Contiguous Zone, the Union of India is entitled to prosecute the two Italian marines under the criminal justice system prevalent in the country. However, the same is subject to the provisions of Article 100 of UNCLOS 1982. I agree with Mr. Salve that the “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Family Relations and Cooperation between States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations” has to be conducted only at the level of the Federal or Central Government and cannot be the subject matter of a proceeding initiated by a Provincial/State Government.

101. While, therefore, holding that the State of Kerala has no jurisdiction to investigate into the incident, I am also of the view that till such time as it is proved that the provisions of Article 100 of the UNCLOS 1982 apply to the facts of this case, it is the Union of India which has jurisdiction to proceed with the investigation and trial of the Petitioner Nos.2 and 3 in the Writ Petition. The Union of India is, therefore, directed, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India, to set up a Special Court to try this case and to dispose of the same in accordance with the provisions of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976, the Indian Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure and most importantly, the provisions of UNCLOS 1982, where there is no conflict between the domestic law and UNCLOS 1982. The pending proceedings before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kollam, shall stand transferred to the Special Court to be constituted in terms of this judgment and it is expected that the same shall be disposed of expeditiously. This will not prevent the Petitioners herein in the two matters from invoking the provisions of Article 100 of UNCLOS 1982, upon adducing evidence in support thereof, whereupon the question of jurisdiction of the Union of India to investigate into the incident and for the Courts in India to try the accused may be reconsidered. If it is found that both the Republic of Italy and the Republic of India have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter, then these directions will continue to hold good.

The Judgement is something of a compromise as it takes jurisdiction away from the state of Kerala where local press were decidedly one-sided in their evaluations of the parties at fault. The trial will take place in Delhi where the marines might have a better chance of receiving a fair trial. However, the judgement rejects Italy’s claim to exclusive criminal jurisdiction in this case. The Supreme Court’s reading of the Lotus case in view of UNCLOS is crucial and merits further analysis. We hope to provide further analysis soon.