In Brief: the Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia

(Participants to the Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia)

The Second Istanbul Conference on Somalia took place in Istanbul, Turkey from 31 May to 1 June 2012. The Conference, which followed an initial event held in 2010, was attended by several representatives of Somalia’s government, autonomous regions, tribal elders and diaspora, as well as of the international community. Under the theme “Preparing Somalia’s Future: Goals for 2015”, the Conference focused on long-term and multi-dimensional solutions to the country democratization process, including recovery, social and economic development and peace consolidation.

Organized in partnership with the United Nations, the Conference is the lastest effort in Turkey’s growing engagement in Somalia. In recent years, Turkey launched a major diplomatic, economic and humanitarian campaign culminating with the visit of its Prime Minister to Mogadishu and the opening of an Embassy in 2011. Turkey’s “ soft power” efforts have drawn praises as well as some concerns, particularly by the US and Ethiopia.

“[P]rimary responsibility for establishing a political solution in the country lies with Somalis. The role of the international community is to support Somalis to provide leadership and ownership in rebuilding a functioning state and local governments that can provide security, ensure the rule of law and respect for human rights, provide basic social services and create an enabling environment that allows for economic opportunity for all its citizens.”

(Istanbul II Declaration)

Obviously, piracy featured in the Conference Agenda. However, also in light of the upcoming specialized Second International Counter-Piracy Conference in Dubai, UAE on 27-28 June 2012, the International Piracy Conference in Perth, Australia on 15-17 July 2012 as well as the Plenary Meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, in New York, USA on 25 July 2012,  the discussion focused on broader issues affecting the country’s justice and security sectors, such as  inter-clan conflict, violence, corruption and misappropriation of funds, kidnapping, terrorism and human rights abuses.

The Conference Final Declaration can be found here.

Update on London Conference on Somalia: Somaliland to attend Conference

The parliament of Somalia’s separatist region of Somaliland overwhelmingly voted in favor to attend the upcoming international Conference on Somalia. The Conference will be hosted by the UK Government in London, on 23 February 2012. As previously noted, UK officials expect the attendance of world leaders and diplomats from over 40 countries. The vote marks a major policy shift for the separatist region, a former British protectorate, which has deliberately stayed away from several peace conferences concerning the situation in Somalia. Somaliland is located in northwestern Somalia, bordering Ethiopia in the south and west, Djibouti in the northwest and the autonomous Puntland region of Somalia to the east. Somaliland unilaterally declared independence from the rest of the country in 1991 but has not been recognized internationally.

Save the Date: London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012

As indicated in a recent post, the UK will host the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012. Around 40 governments are expected to attend, along with the United Nations, African Union, European Union, World Bank, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, the Organisation of Islamic Conference, and the League of Arab States. Representatives of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions, as well as the Presidents of the breakaway and autonomous regions of Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug are also expected to attend. Ahead of the Conference, the UK Foreign Secretary today visited Mogadishu for the first time in nearly twenty years.

Somalia has been without an effective central government since President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. More than twenty years of civil war have had a dramatic effect on Somalia and its population. Announcing the Conference, UK Prime Minister David Cameron described Somalia as “a failed State”. Notably, the mandate of the Transitional Federal Institutions currently in charge of governing Somalia is due to end in August 2012.

The conference will discuss how the international community and Somali political leaders can step-up their efforts to tackle both the root causes and effects of the problems in the country. Central to the discussion are, obviously, anti-piracy efforts and perspectives. We will be trying to closely follow any relevant development in this regard, both on this blog as well as on our facebook page. In the meantime, those who are interested in this topic can follow the debate on the blog of the newly appointed UK Ambassador to Somalia.

The Legality of the SEAL Team 6 Rescue in Somalia

US Navy SEALs have rescued two foreign aid workers (one American and one Dane) deep within the territory of Somalia, killing 8-9 Somalis and perhaps capturing 3-5. This is not the first time the US has authorized deadly force against Somali criminals. In 2009, pirates took hostage the captain of the Maersk Alabama, Richard Phillips. A team of snipers from the Navy SEALs shot the captors from the deck of an aircraft carrier, killing the pirates and freeing Captain Phillips. There are significant differences, however, between the attack on the Maersk Alabama and the most recent attack mainly because the latter occurred within the territory of Somalia on land. The location of the capture and rescue, Galkayo, is divided between the break-away regions of Puntland and Galmudug and, according to the New York Times is at the edge of pirate-controlled territory. Most news organizations are referring to the Somali captors as “pirates” and it may be that the criminal organization that kidnapped and held for ransom these two aid workers has also perpetrated acts of piracy in the seas off the coast of Somalia. But the act of kidnapping in central Somalia is not an act of piracy. This has several implications.

First, what is the legal basis for the incursion into Somali territory? States have a right to capture and prosecute criminals for acts of piracy on the high seas and for armed robbery within a state’s territorial sea. Piracy, however, does not extend to acts without any connection to sea-based criminality. In contrast, for land-based incursions violating the territorial sovereignty of another state, prior assent is required. The U.S. raid of Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan was ostensibly justified by national self-defence in order to prevent future attacks against Americans which were in the process of being developed. But the criminals in Galkayo did not appear to be threatening the national security of the United States. They seek ransom money, and not some political objective. Therefore national self-defence would not provide a justification for the raid. Nonetheless, the areas of Somalia we are talking about are lawless and without effective governments. In these circumstances, it is doubtful the U.S. considered permission was required prior to invading the territory.

Second, what is the legal basis for the killing and capturing of these criminals? As a legal matter, the former is actually simpler to explain. The doctrine of personal self-defence sometimes extends to the protection of others. If it was determined that the hostages’ lives were in danger, it could justify the use of deadly force. However, news reports indicate the operation was intended to capture, not kill, the criminals in question. Therefore, what is the legal basis for the capture of these Somali criminals? This is actually the more difficult legal question. International treaty and customary law give states the right to arrest and prosecute suspected pirates for criminality on the high seas. Likewise, commercial ships have the right to defend themselves against violent attack. In contrast, yesterday’s rescue occurred on land and the law of piracy is inapplicable. In addition, no Somali law is readily apparent. However, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime requires states parties to pass legislation prohibiting the commission of serious crimes involving an organized criminal group where the crime has transnational effects. (the U.S. is a state party, obviously Somalia is not). Likewise, there appears to be a developing consensus that kidnapping is a crime under customary international law with certain well-defined attributes. Therefore, the United States has a jurisdictional basis to prosecute these criminals as the victim was American and there is, arguably, substantive international law applicable in the territory of Somalia which prohibits and would permit a prosecution for kidnapping. Normally, a prosecution would require the U.S. to seek extradition from the suspect’s resident state. Here, where no sovereign exists, the U.S. could argue that it had no such duty. These are some of the arguments that might justify the arrest and detention of the Somali captors pending trial.

Apart from these legal questions is a more practical one: does this signal a new U.S. policy of using its armed forces to rescue American kidnapping victims throughout the world? Following the raid, President Obama issued a statement asserting, “The United States will not tolerate the abduction of our people, and will spare no effort to secure the safety of our citizens and to bring their captors to justice.” This statement must be narrowly construed. Although the U.S. State Department does not publicize the number of Americans kidnapped and held for ransom, it is clearly a widespread problem. The expense and risks of sending in a SEAL team anytime an American is kidnapped would be extraordinary. The Somali context is exceptional in this case because there is no sovereign with whom to negotiate. In addition, this may be a shot across the bow to organized criminal gangs in Somalia. The hope will likely be that this incredible rescue will have a deterrent effect that would diminish the need for similar missions in the future. It could also serve as leverage in ransom negotiations, discouraging captors from becoming too greedy in their demands. On the other hand, there is a concern that the apprehension and killing of these transmaritime criminals will lead to a further escalation in violence.

A Decentralized Approach to Augmenting Somali Governance

The problem of poor governance lies at the heart of Somalia’s famine and its problems with criminality including piracy. In this regard, this week’s Foreign Affairs contains two articles concerning governance failures in Somalia. Each article critiques the Transition Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu and suggests the solution to governance is a more decentralized approach. First, Kenya’s President Kibaki writes:

A new round of talks should recognize that ethnic and tribal differences in Somalia are not easily bridgeable. Thus, efforts to support and reform the TFG must be accompanied by a determined effort to decentralize power to Somalia’s different ethnicities and geographies.

While recognizing the need to engage with the TFG, Kibaki presages a federal structure whereby each political subdivision retains considerable autonomy. The second article provides a more extreme view, suggesting the U.S. and UN give up on the TFG altogether. In this article, two members of the Atlantic Council, Bronwyn Bruton and J. Peter Pham, provide a devastating assessment of the TFG’s prospects for success:

This year, the TFG and UN mediators agreed to create a road map for accomplishing these tasks and decided to prioritize local elections. This was a clever move, since doing so will delay presidential and parliamentary elections, leaving the current president, prime minister, and speaker of parliament safely in their seats. Given the inability of the president, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, to collaborate with any faction outside of his presidential compound, it is unlikely that even municipal elections will take place. The road map has probably done little more than postpone the inevitable reckoning by one more year.

As a result, governance in Somalia remains highly fractured and lends itself to continued fighting:

The weakness of both al Shabab and the TFG has produced a confusing security vacuum in Mogadishu that appears to be spreading outside of the capital. As both the TFG and al Shabab falter, Somalia’s watchful clans have stepped into the fray. Various militias, including some led by the warlords who infamously stole food relief and tortured Somalia’s population during the 1991 famine, are vying for control.

Bruton and Pham therefore propose a pragmatic policy they call  “earned engagement”:
[G]overnmental entities, regional authorities, clans, and civil society organizations — would be accorded equal access to international resources, but only to the extent that they prove themselves capable of meeting defined benchmarks and of absorbing the assistance that would be provided them for relief and development. Al Shabab leaders who renounced al Qaeda, promised regional cooperation, and focused on providing for their clan constituencies would be prime targets for engagements, while militant jihadists would be excluded.
To date, the U.S. has actively supported the TFG while engaging with break-away regions, such as Puntland and Somaliland, without acknowledging the independence of the latter. Bruton and Pham suggest engaging instead the clans that form the basis of Somali society, with an immediate goal of disempowering al Qaida. But they also suggest that the provision of humanitarian aid would be more effective and more likely to actually reach the intended recipients through clan leaders.
Considering the TFG has another year to produce some tangible progress, the international community should start engaging with the clans and other break-away regions now. If the TFG fails to produce, the case for continuing to support it becomes ever weaker.