USAID Budget to Somalia Proposed to Double

As we noted here, some within the US Congress are pushing for the US Agency for International Development budget allocation to Somalia to be increased. A February visit to the region by USAID’s top official, highlights this new emphasis. Although, it is likely that USAID will experience some significant budget cuts in the coming year due to austerity measures and a general distaste for foreign assistance in difficult economic times in the U.S.,  the pain will not be felt equally by all USAID projects. Under President Obama’s proposed 2014 fiscal year budget, Iraq will experience the largest reduction in USAID funding down 91 percent to $22.5 million. The flip side of that coin are countries like Myanmar, with a 62 percent increase to $75 million.

Importantly, USAID’s Somalia projects will double in size to close to $50 million.  This is a significant sum of money to allocate to a country with limited structural and institutional capacity. As noted in a summary of the administration’s proposed foreign affairs budget:

Somalia ($49.4 million): The end of the political transition in 2012 and the formal recognition of the Government of Somalia in January 2013 represent the beginning of a new political phase. The FY 2014 request will assist Somalis in reestablishing viable governance institutions, which are essential to alleviating humanitarian suffering in the broader Horn of Africa. Increased resources will focus on stabilization and reconciliation efforts; nascent political party development; civil society efforts to promote peace, good governance, and consensus-building; and programs in education, livelihoods, and economic growth.

In addition to this sum, is the administration’s proposed contribution to the UN Peacekeeping operation in Somalia:

The FY 2014 request also includes $136.6 million for Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA). UNSOA will continue to provide a logistical support package for the Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for up to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel including the reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment including force enablers and multipliers. The logistics package provides equipment and support services similar to that provided for a United Nations 48 peacekeeping operation. UNSOA is working very closely with the UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and AMISOM to help create the necessary political and security conditions in Somalia, working in concert with the international community and other UN bodies.

It is not entirely clear, but there may be an additional line of expenditures for contributions to AMISOM:

Somalia ($70 million): FY 2014 funds will be used to continue voluntary support to AMISOM, including training and advisory services, equipment, and transportation of forces from current and new troop-contributing countries. Given the newly recognized government of Somalia and the security gains and expansion made by AMISOM, increased support to the national Somali military forces is critically important. Accordingly, PKO funds will be used to professionalize and provide operational support to Somali security forces, to ensure their capability in contributing to national peace and security in support of the international peace process efforts, and as part of a multi-sector approach to post-conflict security sector reform. Funds to pay the United States’ portion of the UN assessment for support of the UN Support Office for the AMISOM (UNSOA) are being requested in the Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities account.

Evidently, the U.S. government sees promise in the recent governmental reforms in Somalia and hopes to support reform efforts with significant contributions. Peacekeeping funds are intended to foreclose any gains by the terrorist group al Shabaab. However, the USAID designated funds are to be focused more on job-creation and improving the economy. These are the efforts most important to preventing the spread of piracy at its roots, before young, unemployed Somalis can be tempted to seek their fortunes at sea. Although the proposed budget must be approved by Congress, and there will likely be significant modifications in the coming months, I would venture that the proposed expenditures in Somalia will remain largely intact.

Book Review: The Pirate Organization – Lessons from the Fringes of Capitalism

The Pirate Organization_Cover_Harvard Business Review Press

What do the following have in common: the pirates of the high seas, the pirates of the radio airwaves in post-World War II’s Britain, as well as modern day internet cyberpirates and DNA bio-pirates? and how do they affect capitalism?

In “The Pirate Organization – Lessons from the Fringes of Capitalism”, Rodolphe Durand and Jean-Philippe Vergne take us beyond the traditional idea of pirate as solitary anarchists hunting down capitalism and argue that they all share a consistent series of traits, roles, tactics and goals which bring them to organize into groups, ad hoc communities where “alternative norms of social interaction and economic exchange are designed” and ultimately spread across a broader social realm. More importantly, despite their shorter life-expectancy, these “pirate organizations” manage to profoundly alter our society, particularly through their impact on today’s capitalism, driving its growth and evolution.

“The pirate organization is a social group that controls people, resources, channels of communication, and modes of transportation (for people, goods, capitals, or just information). It maintains trade relations with other communities, other groups, sometimes other states, and often legitimate companies. To reach its goals, it develops new strategies that favor speed and surprise. Its goal is to adapt and improvise, to develop the appropriate means to deal with its enemy. In order to protect itself, it operates from hidden locales outside a sovereign territory. To grow, it appeals to a desire for discovery; it seeks to control parts of a territory and claims certain rights to it. To attract recruits, it plays up its outsider status, and it makes change seem possible.  As long as the state strengthens its hold on norms, the pirate organization is ensured a flood of new members who feel marginalized by society.”

The Pirate Organization explores the quasi-symbiotic, often conflicting relationship between the pirate organization and capitalism. It takes us on a journey through unchartered territories, be it the high seas, the radio waves or internet and DNA. From the advent of the sovereign state to globalism, piracy has proven to be a transcendent force and the pirate organization has thus become a necessary counterpart to capitalism.

“Are pirates simple bandits or counterfeiters? Enemies of humanity? Defenders of a public cause? Agents of capitalist normalization? Oftentimes, they are all those things together.”

The Pirate Organization does not attempt to trivialize piracy or portrait pirates as heroes of our society acting as seeming iconoclasts of the wrongs of capitalism. It focuses on those pirate organizations pursuing novel, at times radical, values which impact on the norms of a society. Thus, it excludes modern day Somali pirates, in light of their violent banditry and merely profit oriented business model. The opposite interpretation, however, could also be true. Albeit unwittingly, pirates in Somalia exposed a lacuna in the implementation of the Convention on the Law of the Sea and in the framework for the prosecution of piracy at the national level. They drove the international community, in attempting to mitigate piracy impact on global trade, to initiate a comprehensive process of judicial reform and inter-state cooperation.  They also confirmed the frailties of failed States and their effect on local communities which will hopefully encompass more inclusive social and economic reform at both the national and international level. In the words of the authors, “piracy is not random. It is predictable. And it cannot be separated from capitalism”.

Event: The Global Fight against Maritime Piracy – Learning Lessons from Somalia

Global Policy Journal and the Greenwich Maritime Institute are hosting a seminar on contemporary maritime piracy. This is the theme of a special section published in the February 2013 issue of Global Policy, edited by Dr Christian Bueger of Cardiff University.

The seminar will take place on April 17th from 18.00-20.00 in the Howe Lecture Theatre, Queen Anne Court, Greenwich Campus of Greenwich University. The event is free to attend and hosted by the Greenwich Maritime Institute.

The Global Fight against Maritime Piracy – Learning Lessons from Somalia

The fight against maritime piracy remains a crucial global challenge. Current incident numbers indicate that piracy in Eastern African waters is in decline and that the measures taken by the international community and the shipping industry have been effective. Yet, the global fight against piracy is not won. Questions have to be addressed how piracy can be contained and prevented in the long run, beyond the engagement of international naval forces. What are the lessons learned from our experience with Somali piracy? What help can be expected from development aid? How can state building assist maritime security? What role should navies have in ensuring good order at sea? What contributions can the transport industry make to prevent and contain piracy? What types of global and regional governance institutions will be required to prevent further outbreaks of piracy? The authors and panelists will address these and other questions based on their practical and academic expertise.

Confirmed panellists include Professor Christopher Bellamy, (Director of the Greenwich Maritime Institute) Dr Christian Bueger (Cardiff University), Dr Douglas Guilfoyle (University College London), Dr Axel Klein (University of Kent), Dr Anja Shortland (Brunel University), as well as representatives from the maritime security sector.

EUCAP NESTOR: Bolstering the Rule of Law to Counter Piracy in the Horn of Africa – Interview with David HAMMOND

David HAMMONDFollowing retirement for the UK Royal Marines as a former frontline operator and then latterly as a naval barrister (Counsel), David Hammond was instructed by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be the UK representative and lead lawyer for the planning, establishment and delivery of the €40m European Union’s “NESTOR” Common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) Counter-Piracy Legal Advisory Programme for East Africa. As part of the advance planning team, David gained unique and valuable experience throughout East Africa, including in Somalia and where he led the legal liaison with the Somaliland and Puntland authorities at Ministerial and Attorney-General level. David successfully delivered the NESTOR Legal Advisory Programme, involving the establishment of significant rule of law programmes and which he headed up until June 2012.

As the Horn of Africa slowly progresses from a strategy of immediate counter-piracy to a strategy of post-piracy development, David kindly accepted our invitation to respond to a few questions on NESTOR’s mandate and operation. The following answers are provided on the basis that they are correct to the best of his current knowledge.

• What is EUCAP NESTOR main role in tackling piracy in the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean and, in particular, what are its main thematic areas of operation?

As per the EU Council Decision 2012/389/CFSP of 16 July 2012, the objective of EUCAP NESTOR is to assist the development in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean States of a self-sustainable capacity for continued enhancement of their maritime security including counter-piracy, and maritime governance. EUCAP NESTOR will have initial geographic focus on Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia. EUCAP NESTOR will also be deployed in Tanzania, following receipt by the Union of an invitation from the Tanzanian authorities.

In order to achieve the objective, the tasks of EUCAP NESTOR were identified as being:

(a) assist authorities in the region in achieving the efficient organisation of the maritime security agencies carrying out the coast guard function;

(b) deliver training courses and training expertise to strengthen the maritime capacities of the States in the region, initially Djibouti, Kenya and the Seychelles, with a view to achieving self-sustainability in training;

(c) assist Somalia in developing its own land-based coastal police capability supported by a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework;

(d) identify priority equipment capability gaps and provide assistance in addressing them, as appropriate, to meet the objective of EUCAP NESTOR;

(e) provide assistance in strengthening national legislation and the rule of law through a regional legal advisory programme, and legal expertise to support the drafting of maritime security and related national legislation;

(f) promote regional cooperation between national authorities responsible for maritime security;

(g) strengthen regional coordination in the field of maritime capacity building;

(h) provide strategic advice through the assignment of experts to key administrations;

(i) implement mission projects and coordinate donations;

(j) develop and conduct a regional information and communication strategy.

• Why the creation of a mission with such peculiar mandate in the Horn of Africa setting?

At that time, and as far as I was aware, it was determined that in concert with various other on-going counter-piracy initiatives, including military action by EUNAVFOR, established work by EU delegations alongside the IMO, UNODC piracy programme and the likes of the Djibouti Code of Conduct, that a land-based regional programme which imparted expert knowledge and training to judicial, constabulary and other engaged entities throughout the Horn of Africa was the most efficient and effect method of assisting with the suppression of the piracy threat. Bolstering the effectiveness of the rule of law throughout affected areas was also seen as being of key importance in assisting with regional political stability.

Hargeysa Secure Hotel and Compound - Courtesy of David Hammond

Hargeysa Secure Hotel and Compound – Courtesy of David Hammond


• What are, therefore, the main differences in the mandates of EUCAP Nestor and EUNAVFOR and how these coordinate their respective activities?

NESTOR, as described, focuses on the imparting of expert constabulary, judicial, coastguard and logistical knowledge by Member State subject matter experts through training courses. This is separate to, but compliments the military presence provided for by EUNAVFOR alongside the on-going initiatives led by the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa.

• What is the current status of EUCAP Nestor deployment and what will be its overall structure and geographic area of operation?

I understand that at the moment staff are currently deployed to three countries: Djibouti (Mission Headquarters), the Republic of the Seychelles and Kenya. They will operate in those countries, plus Somalia and which will be the main focus. Tanzania has been asked to participate but so far has not invited the mission to carry out work there. The mission is mandated to run for 2 years commencing from 16 Jul 2012 and is headed up by Jacques Launay.

• What were the most challenging aspects in EUCAP Nestor set up and preliminary deployment process, given its geographic and thematic breadth?

The lasting memory I have in relation to the initial stages of the pre-deployment planning for the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) and subsequent drafting of the Concept of Operations which led to the Operational plan (OPLAN), was the positive drive and collegiate Member State political will in Brussels to make the operation work. This meant significant and sustained drafting, revision and constant presentational updates to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) from what was a small team, as set against the enormity of the task which then faced us. This was undertaken in a structured, collegiate and team-focused manner with many long days and nights spent brain-storming the successive issues that arose. This was undertaken with significant levels of professionalism from selected Member State individuals who had previously never before worked together and this often required a ready sense of humour from all of us.

For my part, once deployed in the Horn of Africa, the issue of establishing a new rule of law and legal advisory programme sat with me due to the limited size of the team. The TAM ran for over one month in total and involved multiple visits to five States by all team members. There was continuous ‘hot’ planning, setting up of meetings on the sour of the moment and exploiting every opportunity to meet key in-country stakeholders. It was what I would call “quick and dirty planning and mission development” and which proved most successful.

The biggest challenge was, in my mind, to achieve local buy-in for our mission and its purpose. This meant that I needed to identify and seek out the key decision makers at every stage and convince them of the benefits of the EU mission and especially of the merits of the Legal Advisory Programme.

Meeting with Puntland Attorney General - Courtesy of David Hammond

Meeting with Puntland Attorney General – Courtesy of David Hammond

 

The most striking mission development work for the Legal Advisory Programme that I undertook, was in Somaliland and Puntland alongside the judicial and ministerial authorities. This included being present at piracy trials in the Garowe court and spending time in discussion with the Attorney General, before going on to meet with the Chief Justice and Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs for Puntland. The issue of extending the rule of law into the coastal areas, as well as support within the IDP camps for education in terms of women’s rights and humanitarian law was of particular note and interest for me. Subsequently, I was able to draft the individual programmes that would assist in some of those areas of articulated need and which was most gratifying. In Somaliland, the essence of the interactions were the same in terms of seeking out areas in which we could assist the authorities with the development of the rule of law through imparting knowledge via training and advisory roles.

• Current available data shows that piracy attacks in Somalia are diminishing. Is this the result of the international community efforts to combat piracy and what impact will this have on the continuation of such efforts, particularly the full implementation of EUCAP Nestor mandate? 

I am informed that the decrease in attacks is due to a variety of factors, including: EUNAVFOR’s ATALANTA operation and other naval operations, greater use of PSCs, greater use of best practices to avoid risks as well as improved information sharing. However, I am informed that this reduction is probably fragile and could be reversed without careful oversight. As such, the environment in which EUCAP NESTOR was envisaged to act has changed, but arguably there is now an even greater need for the mission as the success of reducing piracy at sea has opened the possibility of doing even more to create security and stability on land, which will provide the conditions for a lasting reduction in piracy.

David Hammond can be contacted at:

david.hammond@9bedfordrow.co.uk

http://www.9bedfordrow.co.uk/members/David_Hammond

http://uk.linkedin.com/in/davideuanhammond

One Step Closer to a Pirate Amnesty

The Special Court for Sierra Leone held that the amnesty granted to rebel leader Morris Kallon (left) did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to prosecute the Accused.

It is being reported that Somalia’s federal government is offering an amnesty to junior pirates in an attempt to end the hijackings of merchant vessels. The Somali President notes that the amnesty is intended for low-level pirates and not pirate kingpins. “We are not giving them amnesty, the amnesty is for the boys,” he said. Depending on how the amnesty is framed, however, it could run afoul of an international obligation to prosecute universal jurisdiction crimes. As we noted last August when President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed first discussed the possibility of a pirate amnesty, the duty to prosecute arises not only from the treaty obligations taken on by states but also the egregiousness of the proscribed conduct. Based on this international norm, there may be a duty to prosecute pirates who have engaged in the practice of torturing hostages or for any other act constituting piracy if sufficiently egregious.

Moreover, a national amnesty granted by Somalia might not be respected by other states who have prosecuted hundreds of Somali pirates over the last several years. The Special Court for Sierra Leone declared an amnesty was “ineffective in removing the universal jurisdiction to prosecute persons accused of such crimes that other states have by reason of the nature of the crimes. It is also ineffective in depriving an international court such as the Special Court of jurisdiction.” We previously noted the similar situation in Nigeria, where pirates had accepted an offer of amnesty, but subsequently returned to arms due to the Nigerian government’s failure to provide alternative means of livelihood as it had promised. For Somalia, the lesson is that an amnesty must be accompanied by job training and job creation to be effective. Such a program is potentially very expensive. However, certain international organizations and NGOs may be willing to assist in this regard.