Somaliland’s New Anti-Piracy Law

The semi-autonomous region of Somaliland has become an increasingly important ally to shipping states in resolving the present quagmire in piracy prosecutions in the Gulf of Aden. In the buildup to t­­­he recent London Conference on Somalia, Somaliland passed legislation criminalizing piracy within its judicial system. It is based to a large degree on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea definition of piracy with some important differences. The Anti-Piracy Law, together with legislation contemplating the transfer to Somaliland from other States of convicted offenders, were signed into law by Somaliland’s President last month. While not directly referring to piracy repression measures, the Prisoners Transfer Law already facilitated the transfer of several convicted Somali pirates from other countries in the Gulf of Aden region currently carrying out piracy prosecutions, particularly the Seychelles. The passing of both Laws signals Somaliland’s commitment to combat maritime piracy off its coast and elsewhere in the region in its growing engagement with the international community in a quest for international recognition. More importantly, the Laws fill a lacuna in Somalia’s out-of-date and politically-motivated legal framework, as applicable to Somaliland pursuant to Article 130(5) of its 2001 Constitution. The new Law is a case study in the potential hazards in partial implementation of UNCLOS terms.

Under the previous applicable legislation, particularly Somalia’s 1962 Penal Code, acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea where arguably punishable as armed robbery (Article 484), extortion (Article 485) and kidnapping (Article 486). Additional issues arose in connection with the applicable forms of participation to these crimes as well as the punishment of inchoate crimes. Recourse to the 1975 Kidnapping Law, adopted during the military dictatorship, was particularly problematic due to the possible unconstitutional breach of fundamental human rights by its provisions, which also included the jurisdiction over this crime by a special national security court. Finally, Articles 205-206 of the 1959 Somalia Maritime Code criminalize piracy and mutiny carried out by ship masters and crews. However, these articles do not provide sufficient legal basis to contrast the current pirates modus operandi in the Gulf of Aden, where pirates often operate off small and unregistered skiffs and without a formalized chain of command. An excellent analysis of the inadequacy of both Somalia and Somaliland previous anti-piracy legal framework can be found at Somaliland Law.com.

First and foremost, it has to be noted how the Anti-Piracy Law eliminates within its judicial system the customary law distinction between piracy and armed robbery at sea, defining any attack within Somaliland territorial waters as “piracy” (Article 2(1)(c)). The new Law also repels Articles 205-206 of the 1959 Maritime Code (Article 13, see also Article 9) and affirms the applicability of the 1962 Penal Code for matters not specifically dealt with within the Law (Article 14), for instance with regard to forms of participation in the commission of the crime. More importantly, the Law introduces a term of imprisonment of 5 to 20 years (Article 4) without the possibility of conversion of a sentence into a fine (Article 10). In the case of murder, the provisions of Article 434 of the Penal Code, which provides for the death penalty, will apply. In addition, the Law has expanded the definition of piracy set forth in UNCLOS by adding two forms of participation: ‘willful participation’ and ‘aiding’ piracy.

Article 2: Definitions

A. An act of Piracy means:

1. Any illegal act of violence or detention or depredation committed by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft or by armed pirates for the purposes of illegal financial gain and directed:

a) on the high seas, against a ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such a ship or aircraft;

b) against a ship, an aircraft, a person or property on board a ship or an aircraft in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;

c) against a ship, an aircraft, a person or property on board a ship or an aircraft within the territorial waters of the Republic of Somaliland.

2. Any act of willful participation in an act directed knowingly as a pirate’s attack against a private ship or private aircraft.

3. Any act which incites or facilitates or aids piracy as defined in Clauses 1 and 2 of this Article.

4. Similarly, any act of piracy directed at or by a warship or military aircraft or a government ship or aircraft whose crew takes over its control by means of a mutiny and commits acts of piracy as defined in (this) Article 2 of this Law.

B. Ship means any sea vessel including ship, boat, speed boat, launch, canoe or any other sea vessels which are used for acts of piracy.

Law on Combating Piracy – LAW NO. 52/2012

(Unofficial Translation – Courtesy http://www.somalilandlaw.com)

Definitions of Piracy

Article 2 of the Anti-Piracy Law reproduced in extenso above mirrors the provisions of Article 101 of UNCLOS, with the exception of some small but notable differences. Article 2(1) expressly refers to actions of “armed pirates”. Article 6(1) only briefly expands on this notion, identifying pirates as “persons who intend to commit the acts of piracy referred to in Article 2”. Article 2(1) also identifies “illegal financial gains” as the purpose of the acts of piracy thus providing a narrower, though more precise, definition than the customary “private ends” requirement contained in UNCLOS.

Article 2(2) is particularly interesting in that it removes the traditional direct link between acts of piracy and the use of a ship. Because of its wording and its location within the Law, Article 2(2) appears to replace Article 101(b) of UNCLOS which refers to “any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship”. Some authors have noted a possible lacuna in the punishment of direct perpetrators of acts of piracy created by the departure from Article 101(b) UNCLOS, which is also referred to as punishing “cruising with pirate intent”. This has prompted a call for an amendment to the Anti-Piracy Law to include this latter provision. However, it is also arguable that Article 2(2) is an entirely novel provision expanding the criminalization of piracy to encompass the responsibility of pirate kingpins and middle-men operating from dry land. Indeed, these types of  criminal conduct might not always fall under the provisions of Article 2(3) of the Law, as well as Article 101(c) UNCLOS, which criminalize inciting as well as internationally facilitating piracy.

Somaliland Territorial jurisdiction

Further to the comment above concerning the abandonment of the customary term of “armed robbery at sea”, pursuant to Article 5 of the Law, Somaliland Courts will have jurisdiction over any offence of piracy committed within Somaliland sea or in an area outside the territorial waters of any other country. In this regard, pursuant to Article 8, the Somaliland Coast Guard have the power to seize ships and to arrest and investigate suspected pirates.

Confiscation of Pirate Property

Article 11 of the Law provides for the confiscation of property seized from pirates. The main goal of this provision, also contemplated by the UNCLOS, is to drain off the resources of pirates’ cartels by removing their main revenues, including equipment and paid ransoms. However, further consideration has to be given to the  full extent of application of this rule, particularly with regard to ships seized by pirates and subsequently used in connection with pirate attacks, for instance as mother ships. The strict application of this norm risks further depriving, even if just temporarily, the legitimate ship owners of costly assets, as well as of their cargo, upon it and its crew being freed from captivity. Crucial in this regard will be the interpretation of Articles 6(2) and 7 of the Law which, respectively refers to the status and the ownership of a pirated ship.

Conclusions

The general thrust of the new Anti-Piracy Law is to adapt Somaliland’s legislation not only to the established international norms, particularly the relevant UNCLOS provisions, but also to provide an effective tool to respond to the modern features of pirates attacks, as well as armed robbery within Somaliland’s coastal waters. The Law identifies relevant criminal conduct and provides a clearer definition of pirate ships. However, an opportunity has been missed for the provision of a more direct definition of pirates. The Law also clearly targets the financing and other actions in support of piracy (see also Article 3(4)). Yet, the Law risks paying too much tribute to the current factual circumstances of the pirates attacks taking place in the Gulf of Aden, departing from a more abstract legislative framework. In several instances, Somali-based pirates have already shown a peculiar capacity to adapt their modus operandi, as well as their targets, as the international community struggles to devise efficient deterrent measures, whether involving increased naval presence in the Gulf of Aden or the harmonization of national anti-piracy laws. With the implementation of the Somaliland Anti-Piracy Law we will soon have a chance to assess whether this criminal trend will continue evolving or whether the legislation managed to fill a long overdue legal gap. It also remains to be seen whether there will be continued political will in Somaliland, and support from the international community, to put this Law into action. Of particular interest will be whether Somaliland will take the responsibility to prosecute suspected pirates even if they are native to other regions within Somalia, particularly from Puntland.

A Broader Trend of Engagement for China? On China’s Vote in Favour of an International Piracy Tribunal


It is fair to observe that China has generally disassociated itself with the flow of the international criminal justice. Voting against the Rome Statute in 1998 has best elaborated its stand on this issue. An “overly active” global court is perceived to have the potential to jeopardize state sovereignty, the cornerstone of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence China has consistently adhered to in its engagement of international affairs. A survey of China’s involvement with all the other UN-backed tribunals further confirms the above observation. Apart from Chinese judges, I am aware of only two senior staff to work in UN international tribunals. China is rarely interested in the work of these tribunals. Starting with low expectations, commentators were amazed, if not at all surprised, by China’s vote in favour of an international tribunal to prosecute piracy. In his speech at the UNSC debate, Chinese Ambassador Wang said his country would be in favour of the option of prosecution in Tanzania in an international court. To what extent is this an indicator of China’s broader trend of engagement with international criminal justice?

Observers arguing in favour of this proposition would suggest this happens in a wave of change in China’s view on international tribunals. In particular, China (the People’s Republic of China only took back the seat in the United Nations in 1971) for the first time appeared before the International Court of Justice in its proceedings in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. China’s participation in this case is full-fledged, by both submitting written submissions as well as participating in the oral arguments. Lead by Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Legal Adviser, Ambassador Xue Hanqin (who later become a Judge at ICJ), the strength of the team is also unprecedented. As the words of Ambassador Xue plainly put:

[although] this is the first time for the People’s Republic of China to participate in the proceedings of the Court, the Chinese Government has always held great respect for the authority and importance of the Court in the field of international law.

If it is true that China has always paid tribute to the work of the ICJ, why is it only in 2009 that China first joined in its proceedings? One of the reasons is the nature of this case. It concerns the competing interests of the sovereign territorial integrity of a state and a minority group’s wish for independence under the principle of self-declaration. One may find it very easy to relate the situation to those China has been facing with regard to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. All of these regions are legally and constitutionally part of China and recognized as such by the overall majority of international community. Yet each of them has been through different degrees of secessionist movements, in particular Taiwan, which arguably has been enjoying a de facto independent status. Beijing has unequivocally submitted these territorial integrity issues as the core interests of China. To resolve these issues in favour of China has always been one of the foremost tasks of Chinese diplomats like Ambassador Xue and her team. Fortunately enough for us in favour of the proper functioning of international law, she has successfully persuaded the country and its rulers to endorse her endeavour at the International Court of Justice.

Those who are sceptical of the above proposition might suggest that this is also true for the case of international prosecution of piracy: enormous Chinese interests are at stake. Chinese vessels are not immune to piracy. In a wave of pirate attacks in 2008, a Hong Kong vessel was seized in September 2008. Later another attempted siege was launched on a Chinese fishery boat in December 2008 and was fortunately defeated by “friendly countries’ force”. At the end of that year, China decided to send its own battle vessels to the area, a practice lasting until today. Nevertheless, Chinese vessels continue to be harassed by pirates. For example, the Chinese vessel “De Xin Hai” was seized in October 2009. After arduous negotiations, Beijing was forced to pay a large ransom. China’s efforts have also extended to transnational crime along international rivers, more particular the Mekong. China has prominently displayed its naval force in response to recent deadly attacks along the river. In conclusion, a lesson has been learnt in Beijing: there must be an orchestrated effort in this regard, probably including the international prosecution of crimes.

Having highlighted the special situation of these two cases, the question to be answered is will these be the only isolated incidents? I would refute that argument. Simply stated, for a country as significant as China with national interests interspersed throughout the globe, these examples tend to exhibit a general pattern rather than isolated incidents. No Chinese would have imagined China being so much involved in piracy off the coast of an East African country. Yet here we are.  As Chinese have frequently said, there is always a direct cause and a fundamental cause for an event. Applying this formulation to the trend of engagement with international criminal justice, the tangible Chinese interests at stake are the direct cause whilst the fundamental cause is the rising awareness of the value of international law, the functioning of the international courts and at its remote back the growing role of China in the global affairs.

A further extension of this principle to the International Criminal Court is still far off and the road to Rome will not be easy. After Ambassador Xue’s team headed back to China, challenges to this endeavour appeared. Critics believe if the sovereign integrity argument was refused by the International Court of Justice, the legitimacy of this consistently adhered-to position will be undermined. This was later proved to be not at all pessimistic. After all, China has much to learn in defending its national interest through the international justice system. Yet the signal is clear, China is getting on board!

Kenyan Ready to Start Hearing Piracy Cases Again?

In November 2010, the Kenyan High Court in Mombasa ruled that Kenyan courts did not have jurisdiction to try the crime of piracy. As I have previously noted, the case followed on the the Kenyan Foreign Minister’s assertion that, “We discharged our international obligation. Others shied away from doing so. And we cannot bear the burden of the international responsibility.” The Kenyan Director of Public Prosecutions, is now appealing the High Court decision. Special Prosecutor Patrick Kiage asserts that Kenyan courts derive their jurisdiction from international law, which declares piracy an international crime and that “Under international law, suspected pirates can be charged in any country where they are captured.”

The timing of this appeal is striking as it follows two separate attacks on tourists near Kenya’s border with Somalia, potentially devastating Kenya’s tourist industry. The two recent attacks near Lamu, Kenya (see map) were committed on Kenyan territory. Therefore, even if the High Court’s ruling were to stand, the acts could be prosecuted as murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, assault, or other such crimes under Kenyan national law. Nonetheless, as attacks affect more than just commercial shipping interests (which are in any case insured) and start to affect economic interests closer to home, Kenya will have more of an incentive to advertise its diligence in prosecuting pirates, whether for attacks in its own territory or in international waters.

Tanzania – a case study

One of the goals of this blog has been to evaluate strategies for prosecuting Somali pirates.  A major strategy by the international community has been to transfer pirates who are captured by EUNAVFOR to regional countries, mainly Kenya and the Seychelles, to tackle prosecution. This strategy was undermined when a Kenyan Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to try piracy on the high seas. Nonetheless, there are a number of other regional States that are developing the capacity to prosecute piracy. This is the first in a series of posts examining how piracy affects other coastal nations in Africa and attempts by those States to increase capacity.

In Tanzania, examples of pirate activity are commonplace. But the following report provides some context. Pirates have been captured on the traditional tourist hot-spot of Mafia Island:

They were caught with various weapons, including a magazine laden with 21 rounds of ammunition, and SMG and SAR guns, police said. Anglers operating along the Indian Ocean shores saw the suspected pirates and tipped off the law enforcers, who arrested them at around 7pm at Kirongwe Village in Mafia District on Thursday.

Reports say the suspects landed at Kifinge Village at Baleni Ward at around 2pm on Wednesday aboard a fibre boat powered by an engine.

They reportedly looked hungry and tired, gesturing to the villagers as they asked for food in their mother language.

The villagers first took all the six suspects to a dispensary at the Kirongwe Village township where good Samaritans provided them with first aid and porridge before calling in the law enforcers.

Mr Mwakyoma said the interrogations were constrained by language hitches, as the suspects could neither speak Kiswahili nor English.

The suspects explained after an interrogation that they were 11 aboard two fibre boats, but the boat carrying some of their colleagues capsized and they were not aware of their whereabouts.

These Somalis were clearly far from home, not speaking the local languages and suffering from hunger and thirst.  But this has not stopped them from initiating attacks in Tanzania’s waters.

With the expansion of piracy east and south of Somalia, there have been attacks both within Tanzania’s territorial waters and within its exclusive economic zone. The ports of Mombasa, Kenya and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania are high-traffic areas for commercial ships. Therefore, the shipping lanes through Tanzanian waters are ripe ground for pirate attacks.  Due to the increase of pirate attacks, the East African reported on 28 February 2011 (print edition only, updated article here) that Andy Linington, a top official of the UK union Nautilus said:

We could well have a situation this year where the leading seafarer nations, including the Filipinos, will refuse to crew ships which are sailing near the Gulf of Aden, the Somali coast or to the East African ports of Mombasa or Dar es Salaam.”

Such action would obviously deal a crushing blow to the economies of East Africa. Tanzania has a significant economic interest to protect as well as its reputation. Tanzania People’s Defence Forces have indicated it intends to protect commercial and private ships within its exclusive economic zone. But until recently it did not have a legal basis to prosecute piracy on the high seas.

However, in May 2010, Tanzania amended its Penal Code, adding a Section 6, which gives the Courts of Tanzania jurisdiction for “offences committed by any person on the high seas,”  where “high seas” is defined as “the open seas of the world outside the jurisdiction of any state.”

The law defines piracy as (a) “any act of violence or detention or any act of degradation, committed for private ends;” (b) participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge that the ship was intended was has been used in acts of piracy; or (c) incitement or intentional facilitation of either (a) or (b). Section 66(1)(c) appears aimed at financiers and pirate bosses, permitting prosecution of individuals who never step foot aboard a pirate ship. Whereas Section 66(1)(b) is interesting in that it permits prosecution of individuals who are not engaged in an attack of a vessel, so long as it can be proven that the ship in which they are traveling was intended to be used for pirate acts. Proof of intent might be a tricky business. Certainly, possession of guns, RPGs and ladders might be circumstantial evidence, but such evidence is routinely tossed overboard by pirates on the verge of capture.

Nonetheless, to date 11 pirates have been tried and sentenced in Tanzanian courts, presumably since the new law was enacted in May 2010.

Two other interesting provisions of the piracy law show that Tanzania is aware of the significant resources that might be involved in pursuing pirate prosecutions. Section 66(3) provides that unless a pirate ship is registered in Tanzania, “no prosecution shall be commenced unless there is a special arrangement between the arresting state or agency and Tanzania.” Likewise, pursuant to Section 66(4), the Director of Public Prosecutions must consent to any prosecution for piracy. Tanzania does not want to become the dumping ground for every pirate captured on the high seas.

To this end, EU anti-piracy task force officials have asked Tanzania to consider taking over the prosecutions as part of joint efforts to combat piracy in the region. Tanzanian Attorney General Frederick Werema confirmed that a special committee had been set up to consider the request. Tanzania, like other States, will undoubtedly request financial backing from Western powers to pursue the prosecution of pirates.