Pirate Victim Turned Pirate

October 31, 2011 by Leave a comment


The M/V Quest

Of the fourteen pirates indicted for the hijacking of the M/V Quest, a 58 foot yacht, and killing its occupants, four Americans on an around the world adventure, one of the pirates was not of Somali origin. Mounir Ali, 23, is a Yemeni national who was a fisherman who was himself captured by pirates.  According to a press statement from US Attorney responsible for his prosecution:

This defendant, the sole Yemeni, was part of the crew of another boat that was hijacked by a separate group of pirates some months earlier. The defendant had been taken on at least two piracy outings in his captured ship. On the second outing, the defendant was with other pirates when the Yemeni fishing boat, used as a mothership for the Quest hijacking, was captured.  The defendant transferred to the Yemeni fishing boat and then chose to go with the pirates when they located the Quest in exchange for a share of the ransom.

Mr. Ali argued that he only joined the pirates because he had no other choice. His boat was hijacked and he was promised that it would be returned if he joined in this raid. As I have previously remarked, this type of defence was common during another era of piracy. As noted here, during the 18th century, Caribbean pirates cleverly avoided conviction in British prosecutions based on a defence of impressment or duress:

Voluntary complicity with a pirate crew was important to establishing guilt. Pirates exploited this loophole by pretending to conscript seamen who joined their ranks voluntarily. Since pirates did genuinely compel some seamen to join their companies, court officials considered the impressment defense plausible.

In Mr. Ali’s case, he pleaded guilty in order to avoid the death penalty. The Judge, apparently unmoved by Mr. Ali’s claims of duress, sentenced him to life in prison.

But the defence can be successful in the right circumstances. Larger fishing vessels are regularly hi-jacked and the occupants conscripted to support piracy operations. In a recent example, the UK Navy considered the seafarers of a fishing vessel to be unworthy of prosecution even though the vessel had been used in several recent pirate attacks. They let 20 Pakistani crew go, while turning over four Somalis  to Italian authorities on suspicion of involvement in the recent attack on the Italian vessel MV Montecristo. Duress is also recognized by Article 31 of the Rome Statute which excludes criminal responsibility if:

The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.

Duress will continue to be a common defence in future piracy trials and determining its applicability will pose a challenge to any court addressing the issue.

Filed under Somalia Tagged with ,

Kenyan Intervention in Somalia Will Have Minimal Effect on Piracy

October 25, 2011 by Leave a comment

Kenya has entered into Somali-territory and is making slow progress northward. As yet, it is not entirely clear what military objective Kenya seeks to obtain. At its outset, the Kenyan government justified the incursion based upon recent kidnappings of foreign tourists and aid-workers, asserting that they were all the work of al-Shabaab. However, It appears that only the latter attack on Spanish aid workers for the charity MSF can be attributed to al-Shabaab. While the other two attacks on tourists near Lamu were likely the work of pirates/armed bandits. More recently, sources in the Kenyan military have asserted:

Kenya’s military says it plans to remain in Somalia until the Shabab’s capacity is “reduced” and Somalia’s weak, American-backed transitional government is able to function.

The more immediate goal appears to be to take the port town of Kismayu, one of Somalia’s biggest towns and a major money-earner for the Shabab. The United States and France have joined in this fight, emboldened by the success of using air power to assist foreign ground troops in Libya. The Kenyan incursion into Somalia falls within the U.S.’s fight against the Shabaab which until now was limited to targeted drone strikes in the Shabaab controlled areas.

Although principally a military intervention against the Shabaab, this is also an opportunity for Kenya to root-out pirates based in the south of Somalia and to discourage any further attacks on tourist-areas on its coast. While the Shabaab was initially hostile to pirates, asserting piracy was contrary to Islam, it appears Shabaab has become more tolerant of pirate gangs in view of the revenue they can produce. They are not working together, but appear to have reached a détente.

It is possible that Kenya’s intervention will prevent further pirate attacks in its coastal tourist areas. However, the vast majority of pirate attacks at sea originate in the breakaway region of Puntland, far to the north of the Shabaab controlled areas. Therefore, Kenya’s incursion into Somalia, while perhaps limiting attacks on tourists in Lamu, will not have any meaningful impact on attacks in international waters which have so affected commercial shipping.

Filed under Somalia Tagged with ,

Sophisticated Planning Operations of Somali Pirates

October 24, 2011 by Leave a comment

A newly-released report by a UN agency (UNOSAT) statistically analysed 2005-2009 Somali piracy attacks and reached some surprising conclusions which contradict widely-held assumptions about the reactivity of pirates. It concludes:

• The dramatic expansion of piracy in the Indian Ocean was initiated during the spring of 2008 – predating major international naval patrols;
• Falling piracy success rates may be partially the result of a statistical bias due to changes in incident reporting over time, and may reflect a naturally occurring decline resulting from more aggressive pirate rules of engagement and a large influx of untrained pirate recruits;
• A significant majority of failed attacks on merchant vessels occurred without any direct international naval assistance;
• Counter-piracy training, technology and tactics of merchant vessels has likely had the greatest impact on improved maritime security levels and falling hijacking success rates in the Gulf of Aden

Many have assumed that the increasing use of international naval assistance (such as the EU NAVFOR Atalanta mission) have reduced the success-rate of pirate attacks. The UNOSAT report finds that pirate activity had moved away from the Gulf of Aden (formerly the primary targeted area) and into the Indian Ocean, before the international community created a safe-travel corridor and protected convoys in the Gulf. This suggests a level of sophistication and planning on the part of pirate organizations. Before the international community could react, Somali pirates were already picking their next targets.  As the report puts it:

The more convincing interpretation of the dramatic spread of piracy into the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean was that this was a deliberate strategy planned and initiated not in reaction to anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf, but as part of a hugely successful piracy expansion program – most visibly and successfully demonstrated at that time in the Gulf.

The report also points out that falling success rates do not necessarily mean success in the fight against piracy. For the actual number of successful pirate attacks increased from 2008 to 2009 despite a reduced rate of successful attacks. Faced with more difficult conditions, pirates simply initiated more attacks. The report suggests that the higher number of attacks required use of less-experienced recruits and this may partly account for the reduced rate of successful pirate attacks.

One final point identified by the report is the correlation between a lull in attacks with the seasonal monsoon from May/June through mid-September. It is possible that the recent attacks on land-based tourists in Kenya were an attempt to increase ransom-revenues during the monsoon – when attacks at sea were not possible. Always looking for new opportunities, tourists located less than 100km from the Somali border must have appeared easy targets, especially considering attacks have been attempted as far as 1600 nautical miles from the Somali coast.

Although this report is not fully up to date, the implications are that pirate criminal organizations have a sophisticated planning apparatus, in which shipping lanes, vulnerabilities, sea conditions, and potential ship defences are all taken into consideration. It also suggests that pirates are proactively seeking new targets. This explains why countries far to the south, such as Mozambique and South Africa, are considering the potential of attacks in their own waters.

Filed under Uncategorized Tagged with ,

The Oil Spill: Nigeria’s Counter-Piracy Measures and their Effect on Neighboring Countries

October 22, 2011 by 1 Comment

The menace of piracy in present-day Nigeria derives from its coastal reserves, rich of oil and natural gas, particularly in the Niger Delta region. Environmental pollution and lack of local access to profits generated by the exploitation of natural resources rapidly added to the Niger Delta’s long struggle for greater autonomy. The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta became an umbrella for locally-based militant groups taking up arms for social, economic and political independence.

From 2006, rebels increasingly attacked vessels and oil platforms in and around the Niger Delta, kidnapping foreign staff as well as stealing oil and damaging properties. The attacks quickly became a source of financial revenues. Over time, it became almost impossible to establish whether a piracy incident was politically or criminally motivated as the perpetrators often operated interchangeably.

Faced with the prospect of significant financial losses and local instability, the Nigerian Federal Government swiftly stepped up its response against pirate attacks, launching “Operation Restore Hope” and creating a military Joint Task Force to take strong, at times ruthless, action against piracy and maritime security threats. The government has also attempted to address the root causes behind piracy attacks, namely corruption and a lack of local economic development. For instance, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission  was tasked to address the motives behind recourse to piracy in the Niger Delta crisis, investigating and auditing state governors’ assets throughout Nigeria to combat government corruption.

Nigeria is today the largest African oil producer, with the current crisis in Libya requiring Nigeria to increase its output and revenues. Against this background, it is thus not surprising that this year marked increase in the number of piracy and armed robberies at sea attacks, witnessed an increased leadership and intervention by Nigerian naval authority with the support of important oil consumers, such as the US and France.

While not immediately characterized by political motives, the attacks are attributable to independent criminal gangs composed mainly of, and certainly led by, Nigerians. The amnesty granted in 2009 to the Niger Delta benefited the leadership rather than the middle or lower ranks insurgents and ensured a ready pool of potential recruits for criminal enterprises. Former Rebels have expressed discontent with the disarmament process and have threatened to take up arms again.

Nigeria is now largely in control of the security situation within its own maritime borders, having intensified its coastal navy patrols and counter intelligence. The main outcome of this security clampdown is, however, the worsening of piracy attacks in neighboring countries. This is particularly serious in Benin, which depends on its port in Cotonou for some 40 per cent of state revenues. The country has so far seen at least 20 piracy-related incidents compared to none last year, prompting a call for the UN to consider sending an international force to help police the Gulf of Guinea. During his address to the recent UN General Assembly, Benin’s Foreign Minister described his country’s own counter-piracy resources as “laughable.”

Nigeria and Benin therefore recently started joint naval patrols in an effort to curb soaring piracy attacks. The naval patrols, tagged “Operation Prosperity”, would last six months, involving Nigerian Navy ships and vessels from Benin, as well as resources from the Nigerian Maritime Administration and Safety Agency.

Concerns, however, are rising that the pirate gangs could once again adapt and move their criminal activities further west. Togo and Ghana are already attempting to boost maritime security to address the threat. Are these countries next in seeing a spike in piracy and maritime robbery activities?

Filed under Uncategorized Tagged with ,

New Contact Group on Piracy Website

October 9, 2011 by Leave a comment

The Contact Group on Piracy has just launched a website which compiles a number of very useful resources.  It is described as follows:

Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009 to facilitate the discussion and coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of Somalia. This international forum has brought together more than 60 countries and international organizations all working towards the prevention of piracy off the Somali coast.

According to the U.S. Dept. of State, the website is operated by the Republic of Korea with support from the United States and United Kingdom.

Filed under Worldwide

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