Update: Le Ponant Trial Judgement

Our readers might remember Valerie Gabard’s guest post on the recent trial for the 2008 hijack of the French luxury yacht Le Ponant and the kidnap of its crew. After four years of pre-trial detention, two of the six Somali accused were acquitted, while the four others were convicted and sentenced to four to ten years of imprisonment.

We have now obtained the trial judgement in the case, issued by the 2nd Section of the Court d’Assise of Paris. Contrary to initial speculations, it seems that the Prosecution have decided not to appeal the Court’s decision, which is therefore final. Unfortunately, the judgement won’t shed much light on the Court’s motivations. In keeping with French practice for criminal trials, the judgement, at least when looked at from the perspective of international justice standards, is scantily reasoned, containing little or no more than the accusations against the accused, a recall of the main trial procedural steps and the court’s verdict.

It has to be recalled that the accused were charged with kidnapping, illegal confinement and organized gang theft in pursuance of Articles 224-6 of the French Criminal Code but not with a specific offence of committing piracy due to the temporary absence, in 2008, of a specific definition of piracy in the French criminal system. In the meantime, a new Anti-Piracy legislation was introduced in January 2011.

A High Seas Requirement for Pirate Facilitators Under UNCLOS?

Regular contributor Jon Bellish presents the following commentary, cross-posted at The View From Above. We previously posted on this topic here and here where Roger reached similar conclusions to Douglas Guilfoyle, cited below. Jon Bellish is a Project Officer at the Oceans Beyond Piracy project in Boulder, Colorado (though all of his views are his own), and he has experience in United States piracy trials. He just got on Twitter.

The economic conditions in Somalia are such that there is no shortage of men willing to hijack a ship, risking their lives in hopes of earning of the equivalent of 20 years of income – $5,000 in Somalia – out of a single $1.5 million ransom. That basic reality is the driving force of modern maritime piracy, and it leads to a similarly basic conclusion.

Aside from fixing the economic situation in Somalia, prosecution of those higher up in the criminal chain of conspiracy – the investors and financiers of piratical operations – is the most effective, non-violent means of to putting an end to maritime piracy. If labor is cheap and capital is scarce, it makes sense to go after the capital.

The United States government has done its part by prosecuting two pirate negotiators,[1] Mohammad Saaili Shibin and Ali Mohamed Ali. The current dispositions of these cases highlight an interesting and important legal issue stemming from a common characteristic of piracy higher-ups. They themselves never set foot on the high seas.[2]

In Shibin’s case, Judge Robert Doumar allowed his trial to proceed; Shibin was found guilty and sentenced to 12 terms of life. In the Ali case however, which is still in progress, Judge Ellen Huevelle has found[3] that the perpetrator must be on the high seas for a crime of universal jurisdiction to occur.

What accounts for this discrepancy in United States courts? Who has the better of the argument? The answers to these questions have profound implications for the future of prosecuting those who profit most from piracy.

At the heart of this disagreement is a dispute over the proper interpretation of the UNCLOS definition of piracy and the United States’s federal statute criminalizing piracy under the law of nations. Both of these texts must be read according to one of the most basic canons of statutory interpretation — that statutory language not be read as being duplicative or ineffectual.

Opponents of a high seas requirement, such as Douglas Guilfoyle at University College London, argue  that UNCLOS art. 101’s definition of piracy makes it clear that performing piratical acts carries a high seas requirement, but acts of inciting or intentionally facilitating piracy can be performed anywhere, implying that both are crimes of universal jurisdiction.

To support this argument, opponents cite art. 101(a)(i) of UNCLOS, which states that piracy “consists of…any act of violence or detention [or deprivation]… committed for private ends by the crew… of a private ship…and directed…on the high seas, against another ship” [emphasis added]. They contrast that section with the next part of the piracy definition, art. 101(c), which says “any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a)” constitutes piracy. Opponents of a high seas requirement for facilitators conclude that, because UNCLOS announces a high seas requirement in subparagraph (a) and not in subparagraph (c), no such requirement exists for facilitation.

Conversely, proponents of a high seas requirement, including Northwestern University’s Eugene Kontorovich, cite various provisions of UNCLOS suggesting that universal jurisdiction over maritime piracy exists only where the act takes place on the high seas.

Chief among these provisions are arts. 100 and 105. The former limits a state’s duty to cooperate in the repression of piracy, and the latter restricts states’ universal capturing and adjudicating authority over pirates to acts occurring on the high seas. Additionally, art. 86 explicitly states that Part VII of UNCLOS (the part including the definition of piracy) only applies to the high seas and other areas outside the jurisdiction of any state.

Opponents counter that even if all of the aforementioned high seas references are operable, the drafters’ inclusion of a high seas requirement in 101(a) is otiose if 101(a) and (c) already had an implicit high seas requirement. Any other reading, they argue, is contrary to one of the most fundamental canons of statutory interpretation.

This is a mistake stemming from a conflation of UNCLOS’s definition of piracy and its pronouncements on universal jurisdiction. Opponents may be correct in suggesting that there is no high seas requirement for facilitators to commit statutory piracy as defined by UNCLOS, but they are wrong in arguing that performing an act described in art. 101 leads directly to universal jurisdiction.

Where piracy is concerned, UNCLOS performs at least two discrete functions: defining piracy and delineating the metes and bounds of universal jurisdiction over piracy. Art. 101 defines piracy as, inter alia, any act of violence, detention or deprivation on the high seas or any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating such an act. Where the statutory definition is concerned, there is a high seas requirement for perpetrators but none for inciters or facilitators.

Art. 101 says nothing about universal jurisdiction, however, and the parts of UNCLOS that do discuss universal jurisdiction – arts. 100, 105, and 86 – make it unmistakably plain that such jurisdiction extends only to acts physically performed on the high seas.

This dichotomy between the statutory definition of piracy and the high seas requirement for universal jurisdiction over piracy is borne out in 18 U.S.C. § 1651, which reads, “Whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life.”

Section 1651 splices the definition of piracy and its high seas requirement as precondition for universal jurisdiction, outsourcing the former to international law (“as defined by the law of nations”) while making the latter explicit in the treaty (“[w]hoever, on the high seas”) , which is entirely consistent with the plain language of UNCLOS and the canon of construction at issue.

This means that, as defined by UNCLOS, negotiators and financiers who never set foot on the high seas have committed piracy, but that they have not committed a crime of universal jurisdiction. Unless higher-ups enter the high seas, they can be prosecuted only under the territorial, national, passive personality, and protective bases for jurisdiction.

At first blush, it may appear that such an interpretation does not bode well for those seeking to put an end to the global menace of maritime piracy, especially in light of the widely-held belief that the surest non-violent way to deter the piracy, apart from economic reconstruction in Somalia, is through the aggressive prosecution of so-called pirate “kingpins.”

In the coming weeks, however, I hope to dispel the notion that a high seas requirement for facilitators is bad for the international community. Such a requirement is in line with the policy rationale behind universal jurisdiction and it may ultimately be useful in prosecuting and punishing pirate financiers who never leave dry land.


[1] To be clear; negotiators are not financiers. Financiers perform much less physical labor and reap much more of the profits than negotiators. Though it is financiers that should be the ultimate targets, negotiators are in a similar legal position and are therefore highly relevant. Both groups facilitate, rather than perpetrate acts of piracy, and neither tends to enter the high seas.

[2] This fact was stipulated in Shibin’s case but is still at issue in Ali’s. Although the government claims Ali spent only 24-28 minutes outside Somali territorial waters, it has admitted that there is no evidence that Ali actively facilitated piracy during that time period.

[3] Take a look at Judge Huvelle’s opinion, which is a fine example of the U.S. Federal Bench’s appreciation and understanding of international law.

Somalia Monitoring Group Report Now Available

The latest Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia is now publicly available. The Monitoring Group is tasked to focus on the ongoing violations of the embargo imposed on Somalia since 1992 by the Security Council. The Group prepares reports of its activities, which are then submitted to the UN Security Council and its subsidiary Sanctions Committee on Somalia. The Sanctions Committee concerning Somalia was intially established to oversee the arms embargo and its violations. The mandate  of the Committee was then amended and modified by subsequent Security Council resolutions relevant to Somalia. In parallel, the Committee also oversees a sanction regime imposed on Eritrea. For further information, see here.

The Report, of over 300 pages in length, can be downloaded here. A previous unofficial dissemination of the Report generated a debate on the ongoing situation in Somalia, particularly concerning allegations of widespread corruption and collusion of government officials. Several aspects of the Report are also dedicated to the issue of piracy off the coast of Somalia. (See paras 38-50 and Annex 4). Interestingly, the Monitoring Group has found no evidence that would suggest a structural or organizational link between Al-Shabaab as an organization and Somali pirate networks.

“Somali-based piracy threatens not only the peace, the security and the stability of Somalia, but regional and international security as well. Although pirates have been more active than ever in 2011, the adoption of best management practices by the shipping industry, more effective international counter-piracy naval operations and the increasing use of private maritime security companies have substantially lowered the number of vessels successfully hijacked. As a result, pirates have to adapt and diversify, engaging in kidnap for ransom on land, and marketing their services as “counter-piracy” experts and “consultants” in ransom negotiations. This evolution of the piracy business model is being driven largely by members of the Somali diaspora, whose foreign language skills, passports and bank accounts are all valuable assets. But the Monitoring Group has also been able to confirm the collusion of senior Transitional Federal Government officials in shielding a notorious pirate kingpin from prosecution, providing him with a diplomatic passport and describing him as a “counter-piracy” envoy.”

According to the Monitoring Group, the situation appears particularly concerning in the autonomous Puntland region (see Annex 4.1). In particular, the Report discussed the much rumored Puntland Maritime Police Force, in connection with the use of private security companies operating on the ground in the region (See Annex 5.3).

The Report is also critical of the role of the international community, calling for a more robust commitment to investigate Somali piracy from a law enforcement perspective and to prosecute identifying key individuals who organize, finance or benefit from it, also singlying out a somewhat ambivalent role played by the UK in twarthing piracy.

“The UK Government’s ambivalent posture with respect to Somali piracy is illustrative of a more general international reluctance to tackle Somali piracy as a form of international organized crime, rather than as a sui generis product of Somali statelessness requiring custom-made military and custodial responses. Unless and until this attitude changes, international counter piracy efforts will continue to treat the symptoms of Somali piracy rather than the cause.”

Finally, the Report also discusses the role of private maritime security companies (See paras 72-74 and Annex 5.4) and the risk of some of these representing a potential new channel for the flow of arms into Somalia. In this regard, the Report expresses concern for the increasing use of “floating armouries” to store arms and ammunitions at sea.

“The Monitoring Group recommends that:

(a) The Committee should proceed without further delay to designate known pirates and their associates identified by the Monitoring Group or Member States for targeted measures;

(b) The Security Council should consider the possibility of establishing a specialized investigative group of experts with a mandate to collect information, gather evidence and record testimonies relating to acts of Somali piracy, including and especially the identification of pirate leaders, financiers, negotiators, facilitators, support networks and beneficiaries;

(c) The Security Council should consider making explicit reference, in its next resolutions on Somalia and piracy, to the Monitoring Group’s responsibility of investigating and identifying key individuals responsible for acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia, as well as the movement and investment of piracy proceeds, and call upon Governments, international organizations and national law enforcement agencies to exchange evidence and information with a view to the arrest and the prosecution of senior pirate leaders and their associates, or to their designation for targeted measures;

(d) The Security Council should consider options for the establishment of an international regulatory authority that regulates, monitors and inspects the activities of private maritime security companies operating floating armouries and providing armed protection to vessels in international waters.”

Negotiator Sentenced to Multiple Life Terms – SCOTUS on the horizon

Defendant Mohamed Salid Shibin appears in court

As we previously discussed here and here, Mohammad Saaili Shibin has been convicted for his role as a pirate negotiator in two separate incidents. During the trial, there was evidence that the hostages were tortured, but Shibin’s main role was to negotiate a ransom payment. Shibin has now been sentenced to 12 life terms and his attorney has promised to appeal. Two issues could lead to overturning Shibin’s convictions and might soon reach the Supreme Court.

First, Shibin’s attorney has stated that piracy can only occur if someone commits robbery at sea. In other words, the issue is whether piracy under the 18 USC 1651 (which incorporates the law of nations) is an evolving or a static concept. If it is a static concept, then a robbery was necessary to complete the offence. Since Shibin never boarded the hijacked yacht, he did not commit a robbery and his conviction for piracy, the basis for the life terms, could not stand. If, however, piracy is an evolving concept, then the UNCLOS definition would prevail and, because it does not require a robbery, Shibin’s conviction would stand.

Shibin’s appeal will first be heard by a 3-judge panel of the 4th Circuit. Another panel of the same court has ruled, in U.S. v. Abdi Wali Dire, that piracy is an evolving concept. A petition for rehearing was subsequently denied in that case, and the defence is filing an appeal with the US Supreme Court. Shibin could appeal the same issue to the 4th Circuit and might win if a different panel hears the case. However, if his appeal is denied, which is likely, he will have to take the case to the US Supreme Court as well.

The second issue that might result in overturning his convictions is whether Shibin’s actions in Somali territory can constitute piracy under the law of nations. The Federal Court in the DC Circuit recently held, in U.S. v. Ali, that the international crime of piracy can only be committed on the high seas. Therefore, negotiating a ransom for pirated hostages on land or within a state’s territorial waters does not constitute piracy. There is a healthy debate as to the correctness of this decision. See here and here. Nonetheless, it appears that Shibin only boarded the pirated vessel in Somali territorial waters. The U.S. Attorney prosecuting Shibin said that Shibin was a hostage negotiator operating from within Somalia, and it is reported that Shibin only boarded the pirated ship after it entered Somali waters.Therefore, if the Ali-rationale were applied in Shibin’s appeal, his convictions would be overturned. Even though Shibin did not appear to make this particular argument at trial, if it is determined that piracy under the law of nations does not include actions from Somali territory, universal jurisdiction would not permit the U.S. to pursue this prosecution. Therefore, this is a jurisdictional issue that can be raised for the first time on appeal.

Members of Ogoni Community interested by Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Source: Amnesty International

There you have it: two issues that could invalidate Shibin’s convictions. Either or both of these issues could reach the Supreme Court, perhaps not in Shibin’s case, but possibly in U.S. v. Dire. The justices may be inclined to grant certiorari as a rhetorical counterpoint to Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell which is on the court’s docket for the next term and will require the court to interpret the statutory language “the law of nations” as part of the Alien Tort Statute. The piracy cases might be helpful to those who would argue that universal jurisdiction only applies to those offenses originally contemplated and discussed by the First Congress (when the piracy law and the Alien Tort Statute were passed). According to this view, piracy would satisfy the requirement, but relatively newer crimes such as crimes against humanity would not.

Somalia’s New Constitution (what it does and doesn’t do for piracy)

Somalia’s Official Emblem adopted by the 2012 Provisional Constitution

On 1 August, delegates to the Somalia’s National Constituent Assembly adopted a provisional constitution. The document must still be approved by a majority vote of the electorate in a referendum. Nonetheless, the Provisional Constitution marks an important step towards the establishment of a representative federal government in Somalia. Further, it has significant ramifications for the prosecution of piracy.

Article 140 of the Provisional Constitution requires the Somali Federal Government to respect all prior treaty obligations. This includes UNCLOS which a preceding government signed in 1982 and ratified on 24 July 1989. Of course, UNCLOS sets forth the definition of the international crime of piracy, but in the event of any lacunae in that definition, Article 40 of the Provisional Constitution permits reference to Shariah Law, international law and decisions of courts in other countries as persuasive authority. Therefore, reference may be made to recent piracy judgements in Seychelles, Netherlands, France, and the U.S. among others.

In addition, the Provisional Constitution provides extensive individual rights for criminal defendants. These include a fundamental right to be brought before a capable court within 48 hours of arrest (see Article 35(5)). If pirates are arrested at sea it may be impracticable to bring them before a judge within that time frame. In such cases, some remedy, in the form of a reduced sentence (upon eventual conviction) or the dropping of charges (in extreme cases) will have to be considered. An alternative would be to perform an arraignment (first appearance) aboard the capturing vessel. But for this to be plausible, it might be necessary to bring a Somali judge onto the naval vessel. If the arraignment were performed by a judge from a foreign nation (e.g. a national of the naval power that captured the pirates), the judge would not have the power to put the Accused on notice of charges under Somali law.

Article 35 also incorporates the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (prohibition against ex post facto legislation). In the case of piracy, this should not prove controversial as Somalia ratified UNCLOS, which defines piracy, in 1989. However, the principle of nulla poena sine lege (no punishment without law) is also incorporated within this concept. Thus, without a specific sentencing regime in force for piracy, one could argue that an Accused did not have notice of the potential range of penalties available for those convicted of piracy thereby rendering any punishment impermissible. One might look to prior Somali legislation to fill this gap. But as Matteo has previously noted, Somalia’s prior anti-piracy legislation lacked a number of important provisions and was inconsistent with customary international law. The new Somali Federal Parliament will soon have an opportunity to remedy these problems as the Constitution sets forth a list of priority legislation to be enacted by the Federal Parliament and anti-piracy legislation appears 16th on this list. See Schedule One (d).