Use of Private Guards and VPDs Remains Controversial

April 9, 2012 by Leave a comment

Staff of IntelEdge - A Private Security Firm

The Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, as you will recall, was created by a UN Security Council Resolution in 2009 and is now composed of more than 60 countries and international organizations. It recently held its eleventh plenary session and issued a press communique measuring the progress of the fight against piracy. The statement first notes that the problem of piracy is far from under control:

Concluded that piracy continues to pose a serious threat, noting that while the number of hostages in captivity has decreased since the last meeting (currently 197 individuals as of 19 March 2012, as compared to 250 in November 2011), the number of hijacked vessels has gone up, and currently stands at 13, compared to ten at the last Plenary in November 2011; total incidence of attacks also remains high, with 36 reported so far in 2012, seven of which have been successful;

The statement then acknowledges the assistance that private guards and, government-provided vessel protection detachments (VPDs) can provide.

Noted that the low success rate of attacks was a positive development due to a combination of factors, including the application of best management practices (BMPs) by the shipping industry, the continuing naval presence and more effective engagement rules, deployment of military Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs), and the more legally challenging issue of privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP); and recalled the need for close cooperation between coastal states in the region, flag states, and countries deploying VPDs;

Key here are the difficult legal issues raised by the use of private armed guards and the fact that these issues have not found any ready answers. In fact, the statement,

Noted the concern of some coastal states in the Indian Ocean region about the increasing use of armed guards by commercial ships in the proximity of such states, and invited [Working Group] 2 and [Working Group] 3 to discuss the implications of the use of such guards, and potential ways to address the related concerns.

In addition to legal issues such as when the use of force is justified, some new ones have presented themselves. Private Security Companies were always confronted with the difficulty of complying with multiple legal regimes in different ports of call. While a point of origin might permit possession of some weapons, perhaps the next port of call would not. In some instances, this led to the disposal of weapons at sea. See also here. Now, in order to avoid these conflicting legal regimes, some private security companies have reportedly, stored guns aboard floating armories on the high seas in order cut costs and circumvent laws limiting the import and export of weapons. As the statement of the Contact Group makes clear, a consensus position on these issues is still some ways off.

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A Broader Trend of Engagement for China? On China’s Vote in Favour of an International Piracy Tribunal

April 3, 2012 by Leave a comment


It is fair to observe that China has generally disassociated itself with the flow of the international criminal justice. Voting against the Rome Statute in 1998 has best elaborated its stand on this issue. An “overly active” global court is perceived to have the potential to jeopardize state sovereignty, the cornerstone of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence China has consistently adhered to in its engagement of international affairs. A survey of China’s involvement with all the other UN-backed tribunals further confirms the above observation. Apart from Chinese judges, I am aware of only two senior staff to work in UN international tribunals. China is rarely interested in the work of these tribunals. Starting with low expectations, commentators were amazed, if not at all surprised, by China’s vote in favour of an international tribunal to prosecute piracy. In his speech at the UNSC debate, Chinese Ambassador Wang said his country would be in favour of the option of prosecution in Tanzania in an international court. To what extent is this an indicator of China’s broader trend of engagement with international criminal justice?

Observers arguing in favour of this proposition would suggest this happens in a wave of change in China’s view on international tribunals. In particular, China (the People’s Republic of China only took back the seat in the United Nations in 1971) for the first time appeared before the International Court of Justice in its proceedings in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. China’s participation in this case is full-fledged, by both submitting written submissions as well as participating in the oral arguments. Lead by Ministry of Foreign Affair’s Legal Adviser, Ambassador Xue Hanqin (who later become a Judge at ICJ), the strength of the team is also unprecedented. As the words of Ambassador Xue plainly put:

[although] this is the first time for the People’s Republic of China to participate in the proceedings of the Court, the Chinese Government has always held great respect for the authority and importance of the Court in the field of international law.

If it is true that China has always paid tribute to the work of the ICJ, why is it only in 2009 that China first joined in its proceedings? One of the reasons is the nature of this case. It concerns the competing interests of the sovereign territorial integrity of a state and a minority group’s wish for independence under the principle of self-declaration. One may find it very easy to relate the situation to those China has been facing with regard to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. All of these regions are legally and constitutionally part of China and recognized as such by the overall majority of international community. Yet each of them has been through different degrees of secessionist movements, in particular Taiwan, which arguably has been enjoying a de facto independent status. Beijing has unequivocally submitted these territorial integrity issues as the core interests of China. To resolve these issues in favour of China has always been one of the foremost tasks of Chinese diplomats like Ambassador Xue and her team. Fortunately enough for us in favour of the proper functioning of international law, she has successfully persuaded the country and its rulers to endorse her endeavour at the International Court of Justice.

Those who are sceptical of the above proposition might suggest that this is also true for the case of international prosecution of piracy: enormous Chinese interests are at stake. Chinese vessels are not immune to piracy. In a wave of pirate attacks in 2008, a Hong Kong vessel was seized in September 2008. Later another attempted siege was launched on a Chinese fishery boat in December 2008 and was fortunately defeated by “friendly countries’ force”. At the end of that year, China decided to send its own battle vessels to the area, a practice lasting until today. Nevertheless, Chinese vessels continue to be harassed by pirates. For example, the Chinese vessel “De Xin Hai” was seized in October 2009. After arduous negotiations, Beijing was forced to pay a large ransom. China’s efforts have also extended to transnational crime along international rivers, more particular the Mekong. China has prominently displayed its naval force in response to recent deadly attacks along the river. In conclusion, a lesson has been learnt in Beijing: there must be an orchestrated effort in this regard, probably including the international prosecution of crimes.

Having highlighted the special situation of these two cases, the question to be answered is will these be the only isolated incidents? I would refute that argument. Simply stated, for a country as significant as China with national interests interspersed throughout the globe, these examples tend to exhibit a general pattern rather than isolated incidents. No Chinese would have imagined China being so much involved in piracy off the coast of an East African country. Yet here we are.  As Chinese have frequently said, there is always a direct cause and a fundamental cause for an event. Applying this formulation to the trend of engagement with international criminal justice, the tangible Chinese interests at stake are the direct cause whilst the fundamental cause is the rising awareness of the value of international law, the functioning of the international courts and at its remote back the growing role of China in the global affairs.

A further extension of this principle to the International Criminal Court is still far off and the road to Rome will not be easy. After Ambassador Xue’s team headed back to China, challenges to this endeavour appeared. Critics believe if the sovereign integrity argument was refused by the International Court of Justice, the legitimacy of this consistently adhered-to position will be undermined. This was later proved to be not at all pessimistic. After all, China has much to learn in defending its national interest through the international justice system. Yet the signal is clear, China is getting on board!

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Historic Piracy Trial Opens in Italy

March 27, 2012 by 1 Comment

Another landmark piracy trial involving alleged Somali pirates opened on 23 March 2012 in Rome. The trial is the first international piracy trial taking place in Italy, mirroring similar trials already held in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the US, among others, in addition to “regional prosecutions” in the Seychelles and neighboring States in the Gulf of Aden. This trial provides a perfect opportunity to examine the interplay of international and municipal law as Italy has incorporated in its own fashion the relevant provisions of UNCLOS and the SUA Convention.

Factual Background – Citadel Saves Seafarers

Before reaching these legal provisions, it is important to have an understanding of the rich factual tapestry underlying this case. Nine suspected Somali pirates have appeared before the Court d’Assise of Rome in connection with the 10 October 2011 attack and highjack of the Montecristo, an Italian-owned cargo vessel, some 600 miles off the Somali Coast. At the time of the attack, the Montecristo was en route to Yemen transporting scrap iron from Liverpool, UK to Vietnam, The vessel’s twenty-three men crew was composed of Italians, Indians and Ukrainians. Among the seven Italians on board were four civilians with security tasks, although unarmed.

According to media reports on the incident, the pirates approached the Montecristo from two skiffs and a mothership, firing at the vessel before successfully boarding it. The vessel’s crew immediately sought refuge in a fortified citadel, from which it could control the engine and continue steering. Some 24 hours after the attack, the Montecristo and its crew were rescued by UK and US troops in a NATO Ocean Shield operation. The then Italian Minister of Defence has since indicated that, prior to the security blitz, Italy agreed with UK authorities to detain and try the perpetrators before its national courts. Despite the pirates managing to cut off the vessel’s means of communication, the crew was able to communicate with the naval authorities, apparently tossing a message in a bottle attached to a flashing beacon. With the crew out of harms’ way, the RFA auxiliary ship Fort Victoria and USS frigate De Wert headed to the rescue, launching a helicopter raid from the former. Eleven suspected pirates were found on board and surrendered without opposing any resistance. Four other suspects were later intercepted 200 miles off the Somali coast on an Iranian dhow deemed to be the pirate mothership from which the attack on the Montecristo was launched. Twenty Pakistani members of the hostage crew manning the hijacked dhow for the pirates were freed. Ladders and weapons were also found on board,  including a rocket-propelled grenade as well as life jackets from the Asphalt Venture, a Panama-flagged ship previously hijacked in 2010 and released after payment of a ransom. All fifteen suspected pirates were handed over to Italian authorities and their arrest confirmed. During the judicial investigation into the incident, two suspects from Pakistan were found to have been also previously kidnapped by pirates. They were therefore released by the Italian authorities.

Prosecutors have charged the alleged pirates with depredation and damage to a foreign vessel, kidnapping and illegal possession of weapons. According to the prosecutors, the pirates have connections with Al-Shabaab and the attack on the Montecristo was aimed at financing its terrorist activities and foster a campaign of obstruction of the free maritime transit in the Indian Ocean. The Italian government is participating in the trial as a civil party not only to emphasize the gravity of modern day piracy as communis hostis omnium but also to highlight its relevant social and economic costs vis a vis security and other prevention and deterrence measures. The trial will continue on 15 May 2012 with the testimony of the Montecristo’s captain as well as the captain of the Iranian dhow. The remaining four alleged pirates were previously found to be below 18 years of age and their case was therefore transferred to the juvenile courts. Their trial will commence on 2 April 2012, also in Rome, and will hopefully shed light on the phenomenon of the involvement and use of juveniles as pirates.

Notably, the highjack of the Montecristo triggered the deployment of military forces onboard Italian merchant ships as Vessel Protection Detachment to protect these against pirate attacks. Law N. 130 of 2 August 2001 allows for the deployment of both army personnel as well as contractors onboard commercial ships. As widely reported, two Italian marines on duty aboard the container ship Enrica Lexie are currently detained in Kerala, India in connection with the murder of two Indian fishermen during the shooting of a suspected pirate boat in the Indian Ocean. In 2005, Italy was the first nation to deploy one of its military ships off the Somali coasts, the frigate Granatiere, with anti-piracy tasks. Contrary to an increasing number of other States, Italy did not fully implement the provisions of L. 130/11 allowing privately contracted armed security guards on board of merchant ships operating under its flag. Previously, 2 Italian-flagged ships, the oil tanker Savina Caylyn and the cargo ship Rosalia D’Amato were captured by Somali pirates and released only after the payment of ransoms.

Italian Anti-Piracy Legislation

In connection with the holding of these trials, it is worth highlighting the main anti-piracy norms currently in force in Italy with regard to piracy and armed robbery at sea. Italy ratified the 1982 UNCLOS by means of Law N. 689 of 2 December 1994 which also gives full execution to the Convention on Italian soil. Italy also ratified and gave full execution to the SUA Convention, adopted in Rome on 10 March 1988, with Law N. 422 of 28 December 1989. Article 3 of L. 422/89 introduced various terms of imprisonment for the crimes contained in the Convention. Italy first criminalized piracy by adopting its Navigation Code back in 1942. Articles 1135-39 of the Italian Navigation Code contain the relevant regime for the criminalization of piracy within the Italian judicial system. Notably, Articles 1135 provides as follows (unofficial translation):

Art. 1135 – Piracy

1.   The Master or Officer of a national or foreign ship, who commits acts of depredation against a national or foreign ship or its load, or for the purpose of depredation commits violence against any person on board, shall be punished with a term of imprisonment from ten to twenty years.

2.   For all the others members of the crew, punishment is reduced by a maximum not exceeding one third; for those individuals extraneous to the crew, the punishment is reduced to the maximum of a half.

Article 1136 is particularly interesting, criminalizing the suspicion of piracy where a ship is illegally equipped with weapons while lacking proper navigation papers:

Art. 1136 – Ship on Suspicion of Piracy

1.   The Master or Officer of a national or foreign ship, illegally equipped with weapons, who sails without proper certification, shall be punished with imprisonment from five to ten years.

2.   Para. 2 from art. n. 1135 applies.

This Article, although rarely utilized, does not find immediate comparison within the UNCLOS provisions relevant to the repression of piracy. As elucidated below, its applicability is relevant as a matter of municipal legislation pursuant to the norms enshrined in Article 7 of the Italian Penal Code. Question arises, yet, on the basis of which national legislation, particularly when concerning Somali pirates, the illegality of weapon possession shall be assessed. Article 1137 instead refers to crimes committed within the Italian territorial seas and is relevant for the punishment of armed robbery at sea. Articles 1138-39 are also worth mentioning, criminalizing not only the seizure of a ship or an agreement to this end, respectively, but also providing for a harsher punishment regime for those who promote these acts.

Considering the charges against the suspected pirates, the oldest of which is of twenty four years of age, it has also to be noted that under Article 289bis of the Italian Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping in connection with terrorism carries a possible sentence of twenty-five to thirty years of imprisonment.

In addition, Article 5 of Law Decree No. 209 of 30 December 2008, relevant to Italy’s participation to several humanitarian and peace enforcement missions, originally established a series of criminal sanctions with specific reference to international maritime piracy. In particular, it states that crimes referred to in Articles 1135-36 of the Italian Navigation Code, committed either on the High Seas or territorial waters and covered by the EU NAVFOR ATLANTA mission, are punished in accordance with Article 7 of the Italian Penal Code, which allows the punishment of certain crimes committed outside the Italian territory by foreigners or national citizens. Pursuant to L. 422/89, Article 7 also applies for crimes contemplated in the SUA Convention. In accordance with Law Decree N. 61 of 15 June 2009, to be punished under this Article, the crimes committed off the coast of Somalia need to retain a link with national interests, for instance damage to Italian citizens or property. Furthermore, territorial jurisdiction for these crimes resides in the Ordinary Tribunal based in Rome.

Finally, in case of arrest for these crimes, Article 5, L. 209/08 extends the provisions of Article 9, para. 5, of the Law Decree N. 421 of 1 December 2001, relevant to Italy’s participation in the chapter of the Enduring Freedom mission in the Horn of Africa. Article 9 provides for the applicability of stricter procedures in cases where it is not immediately possible to bring the arrested individuals before the competent judicial authorities for the confirmation of their arrest. These provisions include the possible extension of further 48 hours after formal notification of the arrest and the use of audio-video conference means for interrogation, confirmation of the arrest and access to a defence lawyer in the place of temporary detention.

How will the prosecution charges play out in the Montecristo trial? Particularly relevant appears the piracy-terrorism link, specifically in relation with the funding of Al Shabaab. In this regard, the trial might become the first major trial discussing the link between the activities of the pirates and those of the militias which has been since long theorized but never so far clearly established.

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U.S. Strongly Favors Armed Guards

March 20, 2012 by Leave a comment

Source: BBC News

Last week, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Andrew J. Shapiro gave an important speech in which he expressed unreserved support for PMSCs in the fight against maritime piracy. His remarks signal a keen interest in tackling the growth of organized criminal gangs perpetrating acts of piracy. Most importantly for commercial shipping operations and for the private security companies they hire, he signaled the willingness of the U.S. government to facilitate PMSCs in their operations. Some highlights:

Yet we must also recognize that best management practices do not guarantee security from pirates. Pirates operate in too large of an area for naval forces to respond quickly. The reality is that international naval forces simply might not be there to respond. The problem of piracy is one that can’t simply be solved by national governments. Therefore, we have also supported industry’s use of additional measures to ensure their security – such as the employment of armed security teams. To date, not a single ship with Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel aboard has been pirated.Not a single one.

These teams serve as a potential game-changer in the effort to counter-piracy. This is because – and as anyone in the Navy or Marines can tell you – one of the most difficult combat maneuvers to undertake is to board a ship when coming under fire. While many expected these teams to be made up of undisciplined “cowboys” that would increase the violence at sea, from what we have gathered and observed the opposite has happened. We have not seen cases of pitched battles at sea between armed security teams and pirates attempting to board under fire. In fact, in most engagements between armed security teams and pirates, the situation ends as soon as pirates are aware these teams are on board. We have found these teams to be highly professional. In most cases, as pirates approach a ship the armed security teams will use flares or loudspeakers to warn the pirates. If the pirates keep coming, they will fire warning shots. That is usually when the interaction ends. Pirates break off the attack and turn their skiffs around and wait for another less protected target.

At the State Department, we have encouraged countries to permit commercial vessels to carry armed teams. However, we do note that this is a new area, in which some practices, procedures, and regulations are still being developed. We are working through the Contact Group and the International Maritime Organization or IMO on these issues. For instance, we have advised that armed security teams be placed under the full command of the captain of the ship. The captain then is in control of the situation and is the one to authorize the use of any force. Last September, we were encouraged to see language adopted by the IMO that revised the guidance to both flag States and ship operators and owners to establish the ship’s master as being in command of these teams.

There have been some logistical and technical issues that have arisen with armed security teams – particularly relating to weapons licensing and the transit of these teams through third countries. The United States regularly works with other governments to help resolve questions on weapons licensing to facilitate compliance with the laws of individual port States as related to firearms transfer. We engage through the Contact Group and the IMO to encourage all port and coastal States to adopt legislation that is conducive to smooth, facilitated movements of security team firearms and equipment. Currently, some States present challenges in this regard by requiring transfer to a third party while a vessel is moored in a port. Others impose fee schedules that directly charge against the presence of these weapons. In response, we have demarched port and coastal States and let them know that U.S. vessels may have firearms onboard and we request that these teams and their firearms be facilitated under applicable laws. We have also worked with the Coast Guard and Department of Transportation at the IMO and through the Contact Group to further encourage port and coastal States to develop regulations that facilitate the use of these teams aboard commercial vessels. We are working hand in glove with industry in all these endeavors to ensure these teams are both properly regulated and properly equipped.

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After the London Conference on Somalia: A First Appraisal of Counter-Piracy Measures

March 12, 2012 by Leave a comment

The much awaited London Conference on Somalia was finally held at Lancaster House, London on 23 February 2012. Fifty-five delegations attended the Conference, including the UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, the UN Secretary General, Ban-ki Moon and the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton as well as the leaders of various countries in the Gulf of Aden and East Africa region, such as Djibouti, Seychelles, Mauritius, Kenya and Tanzania. Leaders of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government as well as of the breakaway regions of Puntland, Galmudug and Aluh Sunnah wal Jamaah (ASWJ) also participated. As anticipated, the self declared autonomous region of Somaliland attended the Conference, marking a major policy shift for the former British protectorate which deliberately stayed away from several previous peace conferences on Somalia. While the participation of all regions of Somalia was certainly a legitimating factor for the Conference, it is worth noting that the direct interests of Somalia were represented by 5 different delegations.

The Conference was meant to be a key moment in Somalia’s troubled history and called for a change in the international approach from the fruitless policies of the past 20 years. The Conference was preceded by much debate and a degree of controversy, particularly on the future of Somalia’s transitional federal institutions, whose mandate will end in August 2012. The Somali diaspora showed hope for more inclusiveness in building the political and economic landscape of the country. On the eve of the conference, in a bid to increase leverage of the decisions to be taken in London, the UN Security Council boosted the current African Union peacekeeping mission, raising its troop contingent up to 17000 soldiers.

The Conference registered a series of important political commitments from the stakeholders of the Somali cause, relevant to political, humanitarian, security and governance issues. Notably, leaders attending the Conference recognized the importance of empowering the Somali population and creating accountability for its political leadership, with the international community acting as a facilitator of the process. We will soon assess whether these commitments could turn into effective and practical action and what will be their contribution in shaping the future of this country. Not surprisingly, the fight against piracy occupied a prominent place in the discussion. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Conference in this regard was the acknowledgment that piracy in Somalia requires a comprehensive approach on land as well as at sea to tackle the root causes of piracy. This is a very important step. A military-focused approach of targeting pirates at sea coupled with limited judicial accountability measures could only provide a short term deterrent if not coupled with social development, economic growth and good governance. The underlying causes of piracy, but also its direct effects, are inextricably intertwined with all other problems affecting Somalia.

“We agreed that piracy cannot be solved by military means alone, and reiterated the importance of supporting communities to tackle the underlying causes of piracy, and improving the effective use of Somali coastal waters through regional maritime capacity-building measures.”

Some of the most encouraging developments of the Conference pertain to the immediate fight against piracy. These include the signing of important agreements enhancing the current plans by the international community to create a “cycle of justice”, or, as we called it, a “Globalized System of Criminal Justice”, where pirates are caught at sea, transferred to regional states for prosecution and, finally, imprisoned in Somalia. Hosting the Conference created momentum upon the UK’s own contribution to tackle piracy. The UK and Tanzania signed a memorandum of understanding allowing the UK Royal Navy to transfer suspected pirates apprehended at sea to Tanzania for prosecution. The UK also signed a statement of intent with Mauritius for the same purposes. These agreements are particularly relevant in light of Kenya’s current suspension of the transfer of suspected pirates for prosecution before its national courts. Plans for the imprisonment of pirates also registered some significant development. Puntland committed to the transfer of convicted pirates in the region to its prisons from August 2012. In an effort to enhance its anti-piracy strategy, Somaliland will also focus on improving its capacity to jail suspected and convicted offenders. Somaliland signed a ground breaking agreement with Seychelles for the transfer of convicted pirates to its prisons. In addition, Somaliland has recently passed a law declaring piracy illegal and making it an offense punishable by a maximum of twenty-five years. Somaliland previously limited prosecutions to charging alleged pirates with armed robbery.

“There will be no impunity for piracy. We called for greater development of judicial capacity to prosecute and detain those behind piracy both in Somalia and in the wider region and recognised the need to strengthen capacity in regional states. We welcomed new arrangements, which enable some states and naval operations to transfer suspected pirates captured at sea for trial by partners across the Indian Ocean region, and if convicted, to transfer them to prisons in Puntland and Somaliland which meet international standards. We noted the intention to consider further the possibility of creating courts in Somalia specialised in dealing with piracy.”

The first chance to evaluate the outcome of the London Conference will be, yet again, at another conference. Turkey, an increasingly growing ally of the Somali cause, will organize in cooperation with the UN the Second International Conference on Somalia. The conference will be held on 1 June 2012 in Istanbul. In addition, the UAE, the current chair of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. will host a second International Maritime Counter-Piracy Conference on 27-28 June 2012 in Dubai, further to an initial event hosted in April 2011. But the real work will be on the ground as attempts are made to execute the promises made at the conference, including exercising the rights and obligations set out in the newly minted transfer agreements.

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