Save the Date: London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012

As indicated in a recent post, the UK will host the London Conference on Somalia on 23 February 2012. Around 40 governments are expected to attend, along with the United Nations, African Union, European Union, World Bank, the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development, the Organisation of Islamic Conference, and the League of Arab States. Representatives of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions, as well as the Presidents of the breakaway and autonomous regions of Somaliland, Puntland and Galmudug are also expected to attend. Ahead of the Conference, the UK Foreign Secretary today visited Mogadishu for the first time in nearly twenty years.

Somalia has been without an effective central government since President Siad Barre was overthrown in 1991. More than twenty years of civil war have had a dramatic effect on Somalia and its population. Announcing the Conference, UK Prime Minister David Cameron described Somalia as “a failed State”. Notably, the mandate of the Transitional Federal Institutions currently in charge of governing Somalia is due to end in August 2012.

The conference will discuss how the international community and Somali political leaders can step-up their efforts to tackle both the root causes and effects of the problems in the country. Central to the discussion are, obviously, anti-piracy efforts and perspectives. We will be trying to closely follow any relevant development in this regard, both on this blog as well as on our facebook page. In the meantime, those who are interested in this topic can follow the debate on the blog of the newly appointed UK Ambassador to Somalia.

The OTHER Anti-Piracy Legislation

There is a continuing debate over whether flag states should sanction the hiring of armed guards aboard commercial ships. There are significant financial risks associated with hiring Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), including liability for damages to cargo and crew. As a Congressional Research Office report concluded in April 2011, “Some industry experts suggest that hiring armed security teams may be more expensive than taking the risk and paying the occasional ransom.” Nonetheless, there is a growing trend among flag states to permit the use of PMSCs on-board commercial ships. India and the UK paved the way, and a number of other states have indicated a willingness to accept such practices. Just today it was announced that the Philippines issued guidelines to permit armed security details.

Likely because of prior controversies in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has been reluctant to embrace the use of PMSCs aboard marine vessels. Thus far, the U.S. has not publicly sanctioned the use of PMSCs, although some reports indicate that the U.S. State Department has privately encouraged the use of PMSCs in pirate hot spots. It is in this context that in November 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Piracy Suppression Act of 2011 (within H.R. 2838) which would require the Department of Transportation to train U.S. mariners in “standard rules for the use of force for self defense […] including instruction on firearm safety for crewmembers of vessels.” This suggests that mariners would be permitted to carry and use firearms in certain situations. The Bill would also require all U.S. flagged ships carrying goods belonging to the United States to be provided with armed personnel to be paid for by the U.S. government. The initial house bill was even more ambitious and would have permit the U.S. to seek reimbursement for U.S. military assistance to pirate victims from other states, as well as criminalize attempts to commit piracy. Interestingly, the Senate version of the Bill (S. 1665) omits all of these provisions. Therefore, if the Senate Bill passes, the Piracy Suppression Act is unlikely to become law. (The House tried to pass a similar bill in 2010 (H.R. 2647), but the Senate version did not include the armed security provisions and they failed.) It remains an open question whether the U.S. Congress will keep the Piracy Suppression Act within the bill. But the conditions may be different this time around as Congress considers the successful rescue of two aid workers in Somalia and the maritime world starts to coalesce around the view that sanctioning PMSCs is the most practical, immediate solution to counter piracy.

New Facebook Page

Check out our new Facebook page.  We’ll be posting regular updates on the latest events regarding maritime piracy and the international community’s attempts to address the issue. More in-depth analyses will remain on piracy-law.com.  Please feel free to comment on either site!

The Legality of the SEAL Team 6 Rescue in Somalia

US Navy SEALs have rescued two foreign aid workers (one American and one Dane) deep within the territory of Somalia, killing 8-9 Somalis and perhaps capturing 3-5. This is not the first time the US has authorized deadly force against Somali criminals. In 2009, pirates took hostage the captain of the Maersk Alabama, Richard Phillips. A team of snipers from the Navy SEALs shot the captors from the deck of an aircraft carrier, killing the pirates and freeing Captain Phillips. There are significant differences, however, between the attack on the Maersk Alabama and the most recent attack mainly because the latter occurred within the territory of Somalia on land. The location of the capture and rescue, Galkayo, is divided between the break-away regions of Puntland and Galmudug and, according to the New York Times is at the edge of pirate-controlled territory. Most news organizations are referring to the Somali captors as “pirates” and it may be that the criminal organization that kidnapped and held for ransom these two aid workers has also perpetrated acts of piracy in the seas off the coast of Somalia. But the act of kidnapping in central Somalia is not an act of piracy. This has several implications.

First, what is the legal basis for the incursion into Somali territory? States have a right to capture and prosecute criminals for acts of piracy on the high seas and for armed robbery within a state’s territorial sea. Piracy, however, does not extend to acts without any connection to sea-based criminality. In contrast, for land-based incursions violating the territorial sovereignty of another state, prior assent is required. The U.S. raid of Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan was ostensibly justified by national self-defence in order to prevent future attacks against Americans which were in the process of being developed. But the criminals in Galkayo did not appear to be threatening the national security of the United States. They seek ransom money, and not some political objective. Therefore national self-defence would not provide a justification for the raid. Nonetheless, the areas of Somalia we are talking about are lawless and without effective governments. In these circumstances, it is doubtful the U.S. considered permission was required prior to invading the territory.

Second, what is the legal basis for the killing and capturing of these criminals? As a legal matter, the former is actually simpler to explain. The doctrine of personal self-defence sometimes extends to the protection of others. If it was determined that the hostages’ lives were in danger, it could justify the use of deadly force. However, news reports indicate the operation was intended to capture, not kill, the criminals in question. Therefore, what is the legal basis for the capture of these Somali criminals? This is actually the more difficult legal question. International treaty and customary law give states the right to arrest and prosecute suspected pirates for criminality on the high seas. Likewise, commercial ships have the right to defend themselves against violent attack. In contrast, yesterday’s rescue occurred on land and the law of piracy is inapplicable. In addition, no Somali law is readily apparent. However, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime requires states parties to pass legislation prohibiting the commission of serious crimes involving an organized criminal group where the crime has transnational effects. (the U.S. is a state party, obviously Somalia is not). Likewise, there appears to be a developing consensus that kidnapping is a crime under customary international law with certain well-defined attributes. Therefore, the United States has a jurisdictional basis to prosecute these criminals as the victim was American and there is, arguably, substantive international law applicable in the territory of Somalia which prohibits and would permit a prosecution for kidnapping. Normally, a prosecution would require the U.S. to seek extradition from the suspect’s resident state. Here, where no sovereign exists, the U.S. could argue that it had no such duty. These are some of the arguments that might justify the arrest and detention of the Somali captors pending trial.

Apart from these legal questions is a more practical one: does this signal a new U.S. policy of using its armed forces to rescue American kidnapping victims throughout the world? Following the raid, President Obama issued a statement asserting, “The United States will not tolerate the abduction of our people, and will spare no effort to secure the safety of our citizens and to bring their captors to justice.” This statement must be narrowly construed. Although the U.S. State Department does not publicize the number of Americans kidnapped and held for ransom, it is clearly a widespread problem. The expense and risks of sending in a SEAL team anytime an American is kidnapped would be extraordinary. The Somali context is exceptional in this case because there is no sovereign with whom to negotiate. In addition, this may be a shot across the bow to organized criminal gangs in Somalia. The hope will likely be that this incredible rescue will have a deterrent effect that would diminish the need for similar missions in the future. It could also serve as leverage in ransom negotiations, discouraging captors from becoming too greedy in their demands. On the other hand, there is a concern that the apprehension and killing of these transmaritime criminals will lead to a further escalation in violence.

International Maritime Bureau 2011 Global Piracy Report: Successful Piracy Attacks Decreasing

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), the anti-maritime crimes arm of the International Chamber of Commerce, has released its 2011 Piracy Report. The Report is compiled on the basis of the incidents of piracy and armed robbery worldwide reported to the IMB.

Not surprisingly, pirate attacks against vessels in East and West Africa accounted for the majority of the world attacks, with Somali pirates accounting for more than 50% of these. Out of the 439 attacks reported in 2011, 275 attacks took place off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Guinea. There are fears that pirate attacks in West Africa in 2011 were underreported.

The total number of pirate attacks fell only slightly from 445 in 2010 to 439 in 2011. Overall, in 2011 there were 176 vessels boarded, of which 45 were hijacked, and 113 were fired upon, in addition to 105 attempted attacks. While the number of Somali incidents increased from 219 in 2010 to 237 in 2011, the number of successful hijackings decreased from 49 to 28. The last quarter of 2011 shows an even more significant drop. However, these numbers do not take into account attacks on dhows and smaller vessels which are often targeted by pirates and may also unwittingly end up serving as motherships.

These figures echo a recent positive trend already signaled by the International Maritime Organization. According to the IMB, this is mainly attributable to the presence of international naval forces in the Gulf of Aden, the enforcement of the IMB best practices (such as the use of citadels, sprinkler systems, and other active defences) and the deterrent effect of the employment of privately armed security personnel on board.

Will these positive developments continue in 2012?