EU-Mauritius Transfer Agreement at Risk?

It is our pleasure to welcome a post by Marta Bo, Visiting Researcher at the University of Amsterdam Center for International Law.  Marta’s post discusses a recent challenge to the validity of the EU-Mauritius transfer agreement, brought by the European Parliament to the European Court of Justice.  Welcome, Marta! 

In Case no. C-658-11 the European Parliament (EP) is requesting the Court of Justice of the European Union to annul Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP of 12 July 2011 on the agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius on the conditions of transfer of suspected pirates seized from the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) to the Republic of Mauritius.

In its first plea, the EP contests the legal basis of the EU-Mauritius transfer agreement which was adopted within the framework of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP). The adoption of Article 37 TEU as a legal basis entailed, from a procedural point of view, the application of Article 218 (5) and (6) TFEU which dispense the Council from seeking the consent of or consulting the EP when concluding agreements which relate solely to the CFSP.  According to the EP the contested decision is invalid because it does not exclusively relate to CFSP, but is also linked to other fields, such as judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, to which the ordinary legislative procedure applies. In its second plea, the EP claims that the Council has fallen short of complying with the obligation to immediately and fully inform it at all stages of the procedure (Article 218 (10) TFEU).

The EU-Mauritius transfer agreement is only one among several agreements (see here and here) on the transfer of suspected pirates that the EU has concluded with third States on the basis of EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008

EU Council Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP was explicitly adopted to put into effect UNSC Resolutions 1814 (2008), 1816 (2008) e 1838 (2008) calling, inter alia, for international cooperation to combat the threat to international peace and security constituted by the situation in Somalia. To this end, the Joint Action established EU NAVFOR – operation Atalanta, the first European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) naval military operation. Its mandate (extended until December 2014) embraces: a) the protection of both World Food Programme vessels delivering food aid to the Somali population and, more generally, of vulnerable vessels cruising the so-called Area of Operation; b) the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast through the use of necessary measures, including the use of force; c) the arrest, detention and transfer of pirates in view of prosecution being brought under Article 12 .

Article 12 of the ‘Atalanta’ Joint Action specifically deals with adjudicative jurisdiction and is the legal basis for agreements between the EU and third States on the transfer of suspected pirates captured by EU NAVFOR, such as the one concluded with Mauritius. It indeed provides that in case of inability or unwillingness of the flag Member State or the third State participating in the operation, of the vessel which took them captive, suspected pirates shall be transferred to a Member State or any third State which wishes to exercise its jurisdiction; on the other hand, transfers to any third State are prohibited when the conditions agreed for the transfer are inconsistent with international human rights law.

It is against this background that Advocate General Bot in his Opinion delivered on 30 January 2014 assessed the content and objectives of the EU-Mauritius transfer agreement.

In proposing the dismissal of the first EP’s plea AG Bot asserted that transfer agreements are not only closely linked to the ‘Atalanta’ Joint Action, which comes under the CFSP, but they are essential to its implementation and effectiveness (para 71 of the Opinion). The Joint Action is a measure that should be situated in the context of the fight against Somali piracy in order to preserve international peace and security having due regards to human rights (paras. 83 and 114 of the Opinion). The close link between transfer agreements and the ‘Atalanta’ Joint Action results in the formers squarely falling within the aims of the EU’s external action and, in particular, within Article 21(2)(a)-(c) and (h) TEU, which set out objectives traditionally assigned to the CFSP. In addition, although transfer agreements contain measures similar to judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation, such traditional instruments of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice could be mobilized in favor of  objectives of the CFSP and be absorbed therein (para. 118 of the Opinion). In AG Bot’s view the transfer agreement relates exclusively to the CFSP within the meaning of Article 218(6) TFEU and therefore the contested decision was rightly based solely within the framework of the CFSD.

Although the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction in matters related to the CFSP (Article 24(1) TEU), the AG claimed that the CFSP cannot completely escape the scrutiny of the EU judicature, because it must be able to assess the validity of the procedure adopted to conclude a treaty. AG Bot suggested that the second plea should also be dismissed in light of the fact that the obligation of the Council to inform the Parliament at all stages of the procedure is less stringent in CFSP procedures (where consent from or consultation of the Parliament is not required). Surprisingly, he argued that the Council complied with its obligation by informing the Parliament three months after the agreement was concluded.

It now remains to be seen whether the Court of Justice will follow AG Bot’s arguments. In case it won’t, what consequences will a ruling of annulment have for the EU transfer agreement with Mauritius? Will the annulment have any impact on the piracy trials ongoing before Mauritian courts?

Under Article 264 TFEU the institution whose act has been declared void is required to take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court. In brief, the Council will have to remedy the grounds on which the annulment was pronounced, which means that it will have to adopt the proper legal basis and procedure.

Since there are important reasons of legal certainty, especially with regards to ongoing piracy trials before Mauritian Courts, the Court of Justice may also want to exercise its discretion either to decide which of the effects of the annulled decision shall be considered as definitive or to maintain its effects until a new decision is founded on an appropriate legal basis (Article 264 TFEU). This would ensure that previous transfers of pirates to Mauritian courts are unaffected by the Court’s ruling.

Moreover, the adoption of the proper legal basis and procedure by the Council will also ensure that the EU avoids being in breach of its commitments under the agreement. Although the annulment of the EU internal act concluding the agreement cannot per se have any consequences with respect to Mauritius, it could impair EU capacity to comply with the obligations arising from the agreement, as a result of which the EU could incur international responsibility.

Indeed, the EU remains responsible under international law for the performance of the treaty and could not invoke its internal law as justification for its failure to perform the agreement (Article 27 VCLTIOs ). In addition, it could not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by the agreement was invalid since it was expressed in violation of its internal rules regarding competence to conclude treaties, in order to avoid international responsibility (Article 46 VCLTIOs).

Although the VCLTIOs has not yet entered into force, the corresponding rules regarding Internal law and observance of treaties and Provisions of internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties contained in its sister Convention (Articles 27 and 46 VCLT) may be accepted as representing customary law, which is binding for the EU.  

Therefore, in light of the importance of the security of legal relations and the irrelevance of internal questions regarding the procedure used for the conclusion of a treaty, the responsibility of the EU for the performance of the transfer agreement cannot be affected by the annulment of the Council decision.

 

 

Piracy in Corsica?

The French press reported recently a piracy attack off the South-West coast of Corsica, a French island in the Mediterranean Sea.  According to the press reports, the attack took place on February 16th, and the victim vessel was a French yacht, with three passengers (including the yacht owner) on board.  The four attackers were allegedly both masked and armed; they managed to quickly neutralize the yacht passengers and to lock them up inside the cabin.  After about three hours, the attackers forced the victims to embark on a smaller life boat (which had been attached to the larger yacht), and then abandoned them on the sea.  Luckily for the victims, they managed to reach the southern coast of Corsica safely, where they reported the attack.

While the reasons for the attack remain uncertain as of now, it is possible that the attackers were part of a yacht trafficking ring.  Such a ring existed during the last decade, between southern France, Corsica, and Tunisia, before it was successfully dismantled through law enforcement operations.  Piracy attacks in the Mediterranean Sea are of course virtually inexistent.  It was thus surprising to hear about reports of this attack.

Legally speaking, it is unclear whether this attack can properly be classified as “piracy.”  Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an act of piracy has to be committed on the high seas – waters beyond the 12-nautical-mile territorial sea of the littoral state.  In this instance, the French press did not specify where the attack took place and whether it occurred in the French territorial sea or on the high seas (the article mentioned that the attack took place “near” the coast of Corsica).  If the attack did take place on the high seas, then we would be witnessing the incidence of piracy off the coast of France – something that the world has not seen in several centuries!

New ISO Standard for Private Maritime Security Companies

It is my pleasure to welcome a guest post by Dirk Siebels, a PhD candidate at the Greenwich Maritime Institute in London.  Dirk has been working with the Security Association for the Maritime Industry and the Marshall Islands shipping registry, conducting research on the performance of armed guards on board merchant vessels.  In this post, Dirk discusses new ISO standards for private maritime security companies.  Welcome Dirk!

Since the statistics peaked in 2011, the number of piracy incidents off Somalia has dropped from 237 to just 15 in 2013.  Nonetheless, private maritime security companies (PMSCs) are by now an integral part of the shipping industry and it is estimated that there have been about 20,000 passages with armed guards through the High-Risk Area in the Indian Ocean in 2013. Demand for PMSCs in other regions, most notably in West Africa, is also rising and ship operators are eagerly waiting for the new ISO/PAS 28007 standard.

 During a seminar organised by the Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) in January 2014, the representative from the United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) underlined that the first certification bodies for the new standard will be accredited over the coming weeks. Currently, four companies are waiting for their certificates which will enable them to audit PMSCs against the new ISO standard.

 While the number of potential auditors may be small compared to other ISO standards, it is important to note that the market is limited. Nevertheless, PMSCs will be able to choose between different auditors. Other companies could enter the market at any point, based on their ability to identify business opportunities and to pass UKAS’s thorough accreditation process.

 For the time being, the new ISO standard is a so-called Publicly Available Specification (PAS) which may be issued when there is an urgent market requirement for such a document. After further reviews, a PAS can be transformed into a regular international standard.

 In this case, the market requirement for ISO/PAS 28007 came from the shipping industry as many companies where looking for a reliable standard. While armed security guards on civilian vessels would have been unthinkable just a few years ago, there has been a sea change within the industry. Ship owners and operators have realised that armed guards are not just providing protection. Other benefits are just as important, most notably an added sense of confidence felt by crews and captains. Many ship operators would even like to transfer the successful PMSC model from the Indian Ocean to other regions with security problems.

 The legal environment in regions such as West Africa, however, is a lot more complex and has caused shipping association BIMCO to shelve its planned publication of an amended version of Guardcon, a standard contract for the employment of PMSCs. At the same time, BIMCO points out that the introduction of the new ISO standard is an important step forward. ISO/PAS 28007 will allow independent certification yet governments are still able to control critical functions.

 Over the past couple of years, the only international standard available to PMSCs was the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC). While the ICoC Association is an independent organisation based in Switzerland, the US government has played a major role in drafting the document itself.

 Various incidents during which private security contractors killed or injured civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan had made it necessary to introduce some form of quality-control for private security providers. Influenced by such developments, the ICoC was first and foremost focussed on land-based security. It has since been developed into an ASIS standard which has been adopted by the US Department of Defense in May 2012, and the United Kingdom in December 2012 for all future contracts with private security companies.

 Neither the ICoC nor the ASIS standard are really applicable to the maritime environment though. For the shipping industry, ISO/PAS 28007 therefore looks set to become the most important global standard.

 It remains to be seen whether flag states will require ISO certification or use it to replace licensing requirements they have introduced in the recent past. Germany provides an interesting example for a unique licensing regime; as of 18 February 2014, only eight companies (six of them based in Germany) had completed the necessary process.

 The large majority of PMSCs would rather spend money and resources on certification against ISO requirements. It seems to be a good bet as the shipping industry has been looking for such a standard and industry requirements have been very important for political decisions in the most important flag states over the past years.

Dismissal of Charges in U.S. v. Ali

United States’ prosecutors have decided to drop charges against Ali Mohamed Ali, who had been charged with piracy, as well as with hostage-taking, for his alleged role as translator/negotiator after the seizure of a Danish vessel in 2008.  The prosecutorial decision not to pursue the Ali case may come as an unpleasant surprise to come, or as confirmation to others that this controversial case should never have been initiated to begin with. 

Much has been written in the academic blogosphere about this case (see here and here and here).  To sum up, Ali was a former Somaliland education minister, who had spent much of his adult life in the United States.  After a Danish ship, the M/V CEC Future, was captured by Somali pirates in late 2008, Ali boarded the ship and translated the pirates’ demands to the ship owners.  The crux of the Ali case (at least factually) centers around his role in this piracy incident: was Ali merely a translator, contributing toward the hostages’ eventual release by enabling negotiation with the kidnappers, or was he a pirate himself, helping his fellow criminals to enrich themselves further through another successful ransom request? It is undisputed that Ali boarded the kidnapped vessel after the violent piracy incident took place, and it is undisputed that Ali boarded the vessel while the vessel was docked in Somali territorial waters.  Thus, Ali’s alleged act of facilitating piracy would have been committed in the Somali territorial waters, and not on the high seas. Despite such unusual “piracy” conduct by Ali, the United States government decided to build a case against him and to essentially ruse him onto American soil.  Toward this end, Ali was invited to an education conference in North Carolina, and promptly arrested on the tarmac when his plane touched down in Washington, D.C. on April 20, 2011.  Jon Bellish, in a prior post, has summarized the procedural posture of the Ali case in American courts as follows:

After a number of superseding indictments, a grand jury charged Ali with conspiracy to commit piracy, aiding and abetting piracy, conspiracy to commit hostage taking, and aiding and abetting hostage taking. Ali filed a motion to dismiss and was successful on a number of counts, with the lower court dismissing the conspiracy to commit piracy count, narrowing the aiding and abetting count to acts of facilitation that occurred on the high seas, and dismissing both hostage taking charges as a violation of due process.On appeal, the DC Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the conspiracy to commit piracy charge, but reversed the dismissal of the hostage taking charges and held that the United States may assert universal jurisdiction over acts of facilitation that take place entirely within the territory of another state.

Following the DC Circuit court opinion, Ali was tried in the district court on charges that survived the appellate challenge, including hostage taking, we well as piracy facilitation, despite the fact, as mentioned above, that the act of facilitation did not take place on the high seas.  Perhaps because of such unusual factual circumstances surrounding Ali’s alleged piracy conduct, his strange arrival to the United States, as well as because of the difficult legal argument necessary in order to convict Ali, the jury found him not guilty of the charge of piracy, but deadlocked on the less serious charge of hostage-taking.  Prosecutors initially sought a retrial on the hostage-taking charges, but just announced a few weeks ago that they would not proceed with the retrial, because of constitutional concerns that Ali was being subjected to double-jeopardy (because the re-filed charges relied on the same basic facts). 

All of this leads me to my initial point – that perhaps Ali should never have been prosecuted in the United States to begin with.  The case was legally challenging from the outset.  Ali was a universal jurisdiction case – a prosecution of an alleged piracy facilitator who had no ties to the United States, and who could only be reached through universal jurisdiction, which has historically been available for the crime of piracy.  But in order to prove that Ali had committed piracy (so that he could be prosecuted under universal jurisdiction), American prosecutors had to show that Ali’s facilitative act under Article 101(c) of UNCLOS need not have occurred on the high seas, as long as the underlying act of piracy (committed against the Danish vessel) had itself occurred on the high seas.  In other words, Ali could be convicted of facilitating piracy on dry land or in Somali territorial waters under the concept of universal jurisdiction.  Accepting this argument is difficult to say the least, and commentators had suggested that a high seas requirement for piracy facilitation should always be required.  Factually, the case was difficult as well.  While it was undisputed that Ali had helped negotiated the ransom demand, it was unclear as to what Ali’s role in the piracy endeavor (if any) had been.  Under the Ali precedent, would insurance company mediators, negotiating between pirates and the shipping company, also be subject to universal jurisdiction for facilitating piracy? What about pilots who fly planes which drop the ransom money? And what about the ruse orchestrated by United States’ prosecutors to entice Ali into coming to America? The district court judge herself had been outraged by the prosecutorial conduct, and while this would not be ground for dismissal under American law, most of us agree that this kind of governmental and prosecutorial conduct portrays the United States in a negative diplomatic and political light.  My argument, for the purposes of this post, is not to claim that the Ali appellate court was correct or incorrect, or to try to shed light on what Ali had actually done in this particular piracy incident; instead, let me point out that legally and factually difficult cases, like Ali, should not be the subject of expensive prosecutions thousands of miles away from Somali shores.  Many of us will agree that combatting piracy is a global challenge which involves, among other strategies, creating multiple prosecutorial venues where suspected pirates are routinely charged and convicted (if found guilty).  But the international community actors involved in fighting piracy have limited resources, limited time, and limited attention to this global problem.  Instead of pursuing piracy negotiators like Ali, whose guilt may be doubtful and whose prosecution could only succeed through a stretch of the universal jurisdiction concept, why don’t we focus on those who actually engage in piracy attacks, or, more importantly, on those who plan and finance piracy attacks? Finally, now that Ali’s prosecution has come to a halt, we have to ask ourselves what will happen to this defendant – now that he is on American soil, will he apply for political asylum in the United States or attempt to stay here on other grounds (something that our prosecutors clearly did not have in mind when they lured Ali to America?) The risk of unsuccessfully prosecuting Ali was never worth the potential benefit. 

 

Piracy in West Africa: A New Model (Unfortunately)?

While piracy attacks seem to be on the decline off the coast of Somalia, pirates may be warming up in West Africa.  As I and others have blogged about before, the Gulf of Guinea, as well the Nigerian Delta, have recently turned into hotbeds of piracy.  The Nigerian Delta in particular, because of vast amounts of oil production which takes place there annually, has attracted potential pirates interested in seizing oil and selling it for profit on the black market.  Recently, such piratical activity has expanded farther south, to the coast of Angola, signaling the rise of a new kind of piracy, focused on stealing oil as opposed to kidnapping crews for ransom.  Regardless of its goals, this new model of piracy could severely threaten the security of West African waters and could negatively impact economic stability of the region, dependent on oil and safe transportation.

On January 18th, a Greek-owned and Liberian-flagged oil tanker, Kerala, disappeared in Angolan waters.  Nobody knows for certain what happened to the ship, but a piracy incident was suspected because just before Kerala’s disappearance, maritime security firms had began warning of a suspicious, 200-ton tugboat sailing in Angolan waters off the Angolan coast.  Kerala’s Greek owners re-established contact with the vessel on January 26th, when they announced that the vessel had indeed been hijacked, that a crew member had been hurt, and that the vessel was on its way to a Ghana port. Moreover, it was announced that Kerala‘s cargo – more than 60,000 tons of diesel – had been stolen.  In a surprising twist of unfolding events, the Angolan Navy denied that a hijacking had taken place.  Instead, Angolan officials contended that the Kerala crew had faked the hijacking, and had decided to sail toward Nigerian waters voluntarily.  Maritime security experts doubt the accuracy of the Angolan version, and believe that a piracy incident did in fact take place, because the theft of oil, which disappeared from the Kerala, closely resembles the new piracy model developing off the coast of West Africa.

The West African piracy model is different from its Somali counter-part.  In Somalia, pirates most often attacked vessels in order to hijack the ship and kidnap its crew, and then demand a multi-million dollar ransom.  In West Africa, pirates engage in sharp and often violent attacks on oil tankers, in order to seize the oil and sell it on the local black market.  West African pirates are generally not interested in kidnapping the crew, because they cannot easily dock hijacked ships in West African coastal states, where law enforcement and coast guard officials would most likely arrest them.  To the contrary, because of the rampant lawlessness which has plagued Somalia for over two decades, pirates were able to dock ships with impunity in Somali ports and to hold kidnapped crewmembers for months without fearing arrest.  In Somalia, most attacks occurred on the high seas, enabling piracy-combatting nations which had been patrolling the Indian Ocean to act against the pirates: international treaty law specifically authorizes countries to arrest pirates on the high seas.  Moreover, in the Somali context, the United Nations Security Council had passed numerous resolutions authorizing patrolling nations to enter Somali territorial waters, and even Somali land, when going after pirates.  The situation is starkly different in West Africa.  First, some “piracy” attacks in West Africa have taken place in the territorial waters of countries like Nigeria, Angola, or Benin: these incidents would not qualify as “piracy” under international law because they were not committed on the high seas (an element present in the definition of piracy found in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).  If a piracy-like incident occurs in the territorial waters of a West African nation, other piracy-combatting nations do not have authority to act, cannot chase the suspected pirates, cannot apprehend them, and cannot defend the victim vessel.  Second, in most incidents, West African pirates’ modus operandi is as follows: pirates offload relatively small amounts of captured product (typically oil) onto costal vessels once the hijacked ship is the pirates’ home country’s territorial waters.  International patrols are generally unable to follow suspected pirates into West African nations’ territorial waters, because doing so would breach such countries’ sovereignty.  This enables pirates in West Africa to seek refuge in their own waters.  In the Kerala incident, where the hijacked vessel was likely hauled to Nigerian waters, where the stolen oil was most likely offloaded, the theft amounted to about 4 million gallons. According to United Nations reports, pirates could net as much $30 million per year by selling stolen oil on the local black markets.  Many experts believe that West African piracy, and especially attacks which occur in the Nigerian Delta, are simply an extension of domestic oil theft.  This piracy model may be even more dangerous than the Somali one, and the international community may need to shift focus from East to West Africa.

Somali pirates, notwithstanding violent incidents and Captain Phillips, generally avoided harming crewmembers, because they needed to extract ransom money in exchange for releasing alive and well kidnapped seafarers.  West African pirates, because they are after the oil and not crewmembers, do not care about not harming anybody, as long as they can get their hands on the ship cargo.  Moreover, because of the lawlessness of Somalia and its failed statehood, the international community had authorization, through Security Council resolutions, to breach Somali territorial sovereignty and to engage in law enforcement-type operations geared toward neutralizing piracy in Somali waters and on Somali land.  Many experts agree that the sharp decline in Somali piracy incidents is due in part to the ability of piracy-fighting nations to engage in this type of widespread  maritime operations.  In other words, Somali pirates were unable to hide in Somali waters or on Somali land.  This scenario is unlikely to happen in West Africa, where nations enjoy full sovereignty, and where anti-piracy operations will likely be limited to the high seas.  In addition, off the coast of Somalia, many ship owner started employing  private armed guards, which also contributed significantly to the decline in the number of piracy attacks.  West African states are unlikely to allow the use of private armed guards on board vessels sailing in their waters, and vessels may only be allowed to use such guards on the high seas.  In sum, West African pirates may be more dangerous, and combatting them may represent a more complex issue than the one which originally presented itself off the coast of Somalia. 

Some anti-piracy efforts have been taking place in West Africa.  Nigeria has pledged to combat oil theft and piracy, and many European Union nations, which routinely import oil from the region, have engaged in limited anti-piracy programs.  However, it seems that two major super-powers, the United States and China, are not likely to dispatch their navies, the same way they did in the Indian Ocean.  For these reasons, it appears that while Somali pirates have buried their grappling hooks and ladders, West African pirates “may just be getting going.”  Unfortunately.

New Piracy Book from Cambridge University Press

I am excited to announce that Cambridge University Press will publish a new edited volume on maritime piracy.  “Prosecuting Maritime Piracy: Domestic Solutions to International Crime” will be edited by yours truly, Michael Scharf (Acting Dean and Professor at Case Western Reserve University School of Law) and Michael Newton (Professor at Vanderbilt Law School), and will appear in press later in 2014.  We will be posting more updated about the book, as well as discussions and blog posts about specific topics that the book will cover. 

New Captain(s) of the Ship

CHO_circle_300dpiJanuary marks the third anniversary of Communis Hostis Omnium. This blog originated with an idea to examine the legal issues arising from the growth of maritime piracy, in particular off the coast of Somalia that had reached its peak in 2010. It has been a labor of love for both Matteo and I, representing many nights and weekends of work. And its growth has been not inconsiderable from a modest blog with a readership of one into an important source of legal analysis in a field that continues to harbor lacunae and unresolved political issues. Unfortunately, our other professional responsibilities have not permitted us to maintain the consistent and thorough analysis that we would have liked and it appears time to move on.

Fortuitously, two highly qualified lawyers have stepped forward and agreed to take the helm. From 1 January 2014, Milena Sterio and Michael Scharf will be the new Editors-in-Chief of Communis Hostis Omnium. They bring to this project a strong knowledge of the law of piracy and practical experience in the field. Milena is a Professor at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.  She has published widely on international law topics, including piracy. Michael is the Acting Dean of Case Western University Law School and is a recognized expert in international criminal law. Both Milena and Michael have participated in UN Contact Group on Piracy meetings and have assisted in fact-finding missions in Seychelles. Our hope is that they will be able to continue to grow this site’s readership and depth of coverage. We welcome them both aboard!

Matteo and I will continue to post on Communis Hostis Omnium as contributing authors periodically and when time allows. But for the moment, we sign off and wish Milena and Michael the best of luck on this new endeavor!